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East Europe

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BULGARIA

Edinstvo Trade Union Signs Contract With Iraq

AU1805154391 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 10 May 91
pp 1-2

["Text" of agreement signed during a meeting of representatives of the Republic of Iraq and the Edinstvo People's Trade Union; place and date not given: "Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Settling Interim Contentious Issues Between the Republic of Iraq and the Edinstvo People's Trade Union of the Republic of Bulgaria, Concerning All State Companies and Foreign Trade Organizations Whose Socioeconomic Interests Are Protected by the Edinstvo People's Trade Union"]

[Text] Our agreement is valid for the period 30 March to 30 December 1991 for the two parties to the agreement, represented by Mr. Kamal Hisenyu [name as transliterated], member of the president's Cabinet, for the Iraqi side, and Mr. Ognyan Bonev, chairman of the Edinstvo People's Trade Union. The agreement is drawn up in the Bulgarian, Arabic, and English languages, with identical contents, and may be supplemented by mutual agreement.

The two sides agreed in principle and specifically on the following:

1. The Republic of Iraq is to make its regular payments to the Poultry Factory in Slavyanovo, Pleven, in U.S. dollars, for a delivery of hatching eggs in the past, as follows.

With respect to expired payment dates: Up to 31 December 1990—\$7,776,289.97; and up to 31 March 1991—\$2,690,550.64. A total of \$10,466,840.61.

The following outstanding amounts remain to be paid: \$288,288.48 by 30 June 1991; \$277,973.18 by 31 December 1991; and \$540,238 by 15 December 1992.

The guarantor for payment of the whole sum is the chairman of the Edinstvo People's Trade Union, Mr. Ognyan Bonev, who, on a historical basis, defended the peaceful unification of Iraq and Kuwait in the Grand National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria during July and August 1990. For this purpose, the general embargo on Iraqi payments to Bulgaria for the past 20 years does not apply in the case mentioned in Item 1 of this agreement. The sums relating to expired payment dates will be paid by 30 May 1991, and the remainder by the dates specified in the letters of credit.

2. The Republic of Iraq is to effect payments in accordance with Letters of Credit Nos. 20-2.18001/1988 and 21-2.1984/1989 of the Elektron Company, Republic of Bulgaria, for a total of \$18,648,530.28. The sum is to be paid to the Elektron Company by 30 July 1991 in four installments, beginning on 1 June 1991. Mr. Ognyan Bonev, chairman of the Edinstvo People's Trade Union, is guarantor for the payment—for the same reasons.

Remarks: Upon receipt of the payments mentioned in Items 1 and 2 of the present agreement, the recipients of the amounts, the Poultry Factory, Slavyanovo, Pleven, and the Elektron State Company, Sofia, will pay 10 percent of the amount to the Edinstvo People's Trade Union as guarantor of the agreement. The amounts are to be directly credited to the foreign currency account of the Edinstvo People's Trade Union in Sofia, accompanied by written instructions in accordance with the procedure governing contractual payments.

3. The Elektron State Company, Sofia, is to supply spare parts to the Republic of Iraq, as itemized in Lists Nos. 1 and 2 attached to this agreement, to a total value of \$4,806,543, to be paid immediately to the Bulgarian National Bank.

4. The Poultry Factory, Slavyanovo, Pleven, is to supply to the Republic of Iraq 15 million eggs for consumption and 5,000 tonnes of frozen chickens by 30 July 1991, according to the price accord agreed upon on 25 May 1991 in Sofia or Oman. Payment is to be made immediately.

The Poultry Factory, Slavyanovo, Pleven, between 1 June and 30 August 1991, is to supply, in three consignments, slaughtered lambs accompanied by a certificate legalized by the Chief Mufti's Office, Sofia, at prices to be agreed upon by 30 May 1991. Deliveries are to be made according to Items 4 and 5 above [as published] or by road transport, as defined by agreement.

The present agreement is legally binding on both sovereign states and will be fulfilled strictly in accordance with its clauses.

For the Bulgarian side: [signed] O. Bonev, chairman of the Edinstvo People's Trade Union.

For the Iraqi side: [signed] Kamal Hisenyu, member of the president's Cabinet.

Soviet Envoy on New Treaty With Bulgaria

AU2205081591 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 May 91
pp 1-2

[Report by Petur Gornenski]

[Text] In proposing a new treaty, the Soviet Union does not intend to impose any conditions on Bulgaria, stated Soviet Ambassador Viktor Sharapov at his meeting with the press on 14 May at the Bulgarian Journalists Union in Sofia. We are ready, he asserted, to conclude the kind of treaty that Bulgaria considers necessary, even in the military field. We will not make any further demands over and above this.

The Soviet envoy explained that the Soviet Union has asked Bulgaria to present its views in connection with the need to sign a new treaty to regulate the relations between our two countries in the political, economic, and cultural fields, as well as regarding national security. Such a draft document has been handed over to us; we

have studied it and prepared our own version, at least 80 percent of which is the same as the Bulgarian one, said V. Sharapov. The Soviet version contains no fundamental differences. In characterizing the Soviet position on the future treaty, he said that they would like Bulgaria to conclude a treaty with the Soviet Union, and not to enter into an alliance with any state or bloc hostile to the Soviet Union.

In answer to a question from the DUMA reporter, Viktor Sharapov said that consultations on the draft treaty had not yet started at the foreign ministry level, and, for this reason, he could give no further details about the differences in the two draft versions. Regarding the question of whether the future Bulgarian-Soviet treaty will be similar to the treaties signed between the Soviet Union and other East European countries, the ambassador expressed the view that we should not strive toward universalism. He summed up his impressions from his meetings with President Zhelev and the leaders of a number of political parties, at which they discussed the need to develop relations with the Soviet Union because they have a deep-rooted, traditional basis. This very fact confirms that a special relationship exists between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. If this is so, why can we not have a special treaty, asked V. Sharapov.

The Soviet ambassador also spoke about the marked decline in bilateral trading and economic relations. As important reasons for this negative trend, he singled out the fall in the rates of production in the two countries and the changeover to making settlements in freely convertible currency, a change for which none of the East European countries was prepared.

Some of the numerous questions put to the ambassador concerned the activities of the KGB in Bulgaria. V. Sharapov said that the Soviet Embassy has electronic equipment, like any other embassy, but that it was not and will not be used for intelligence work in Bulgaria. Regarding the presence of KGB officers in Bulgaria, the ambassador stated that such officers work in Bulgaria on the basis of the intergovernmental agreement, just as officers of the Bulgarian special services work in the Soviet Union.

Soviets Attend Fatherland Party Rally in Razgrad

*AU2205210391 Sofia BTA in English 2034 GMT
22 May 91*

[Text] Razgrad, May 22 (BTA)—Immediate conclusion of a treaty for cooperation with the Soviet Union, including military clauses—this was the main demand raised at this evening's rally of the Fatherland Party of Labour (OPT) in the town of Razgrad. "Bulgaria is stalling the signing of the treaty because this is in the interests of the transatlantic masters of our rulers," Mr. Mincho Minchev, deputy chairman of the OPT and of the People's Committee in Defence of National Interests, said. The rally was also attended by two Soviet diplomats from the Soviet embassy—Mr. Vladimir Merkulov and Mr. Boris Kabanov. Most of the speakers

accused the government, the president and parliament of disregarding national interests, the interests of the Bulgarians living in the mixed population regions and the crisis in the country in general.

It was announced that the Fatherland Party of Labour will submit a document to the Council of Ministers and to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the formation of armed civil units for guaranteeing the security of the population.

Role, Significance of SDS-Center

91BA0681A Sofia VEK 21 in Bulgarian 1 May 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by Prof. Dr. Nikolay Vasilev: "SDS-Fascists [Union of Democratic Forces-Fascists] and SDS-Antifascists [Union of Democratic Forces-Antifascists]"]

[Text] The date 10 April 1991 marked the birthday of the "SDS-Center [Union of Democratic Forces-Center]." According to its founders, this event does not indicate any division within the SDS or the existence of two SDS's. The SDS-Center, according to its founders, will contribute to strengthening the opposition, clarify its strategy, and defend the democratic principles. Actually, the strengthening of the opposition is already a fact.

It was accomplished as follows:

The political declaration of the BSDP [Bulgarian Social Democratic Party] and the BZNS-NP [Nikola Petkov Bulgarian National Agrarian Union] condemns some of their allies of yesterday, qualifying them as "remnants of the old organizations and newly founded factions and movements out of the former Communist Party," as a "group of aggressive people," who wish "to manipulate the organization" and who are applying the "bolshevik tactic, familiar to us from the past, of capturing the organization from within," and as authors of "extreme and reactionary manifestations in Bulgarian political life" (SVOBODEN NAROD, No. 254, 11 April 1991).

A summary of these charges is repeated in DEMOKRATSIYA (No. 86, 11 April 1991). The same was done by TRUD (No. 66, 11 April 1991), ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME (No. 73, 11 April 1991), and others. New warnings appeared the following day: "Forces have arisen that, pursuing dirty objectives, are trying to suppress the shoots of democracy." One of the alleged reasons for the creation of the SDS-Center was "the aspirations of small groups" to provide the opposition with "slogans and targets alien to the hundreds of thousands of people who support the SDS" (SVOBODEN NAROD, No. 255, 12 April 1991).

Let us look at the situation.

Let us begin with the natural allies.

The political declaration firmly states that "the SDS-Center is open to all proven democratic organizations

within the SDS." What I (and I would assume I am not alone) find unclear and puzzling, given the common strategy pursued with insignificant tactical differences, is how and when it happened that the BSDP and the BZNS-NP were able to prove their democratic nature and what, for instance, the ASP [Alternative Socialist Party] should do to prove its democratic nature and earn the acceptance of the "grandeens." Does anyone tell us? Does anyone provide us with even a minimal chance?

Natural allies are being sought outside the SDS, as well. In principle, this is entirely normal. Or, as the political declaration reads, "The SDS-Center is in favor of cooperation with all political and social forces in the country and outside the country, whose political objectives are balanced and humane." The fastest response to this appeal was a power with long proven balanced and humane political objectives: the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. Its printed organ was choked with emotion and hastily explained, referring to the political declaration (and using, we know why, terms not used in the authentic text) the way "renegades of the former Communist Party entered the SDS" and the way "their extremist actions are losing the sympathies of many well-intentioned Bulgarians and delaying democratic changes" (DUMA, No. 98, 11 April 1991). The ideological insinuation is extremely clear: Those who have remained within the BSP are accelerating democratic changes, whereas those who have left the BSP are slowing them down. They accomplish this by declaring themselves against the BSP, which, as we have already clarified, is a power with balanced and humane political objectives.

This is an ideological insinuation that has been totally accepted by the "proven democratic" new allies of the former Communist Party. Klara Marinova, manager of the BSP Press Center, and Ruen Krumov, head of the BSDP Press Center, applauded and hugged each other as loyal friends in the DUMA Discussion Club. It was there that Mr. Krumov earned communist ovations by claiming that "not one of those who were sent to concentration camps can feel toward the BSP the type of hatred that is felt by your recent comrades" (DUMA, No. 98, 11 April 1991).

I do not know what Mr. Krumov had in mind (having, incidentally, forgotten to remind the audience as to who were the political forces that decided on the creation of the camps!) and the types of organizations he was referring to. I can only assume that he was referring to his own party, which absorbed the unquestionably highest number of former members of the former (and, as we realized, the present) Communist Party. However, these problems are strictly his and those of the BSDP leadership. He personally sincerely acknowledges that "the most careeristically minded and the most incompetent members of the BSDP came from the BSP." In the final account, why did the BSDP not pursue a stricter cadre policy!

The same questions worry Dr. Petur Dertliev. His concern is entirely shared (common concerns lead to

common actions!) by DUMA, which provides extensive coverage of the SDS-Center press conference: "BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] renegades speak with frantic hatred about what they were and are instructing others on the nature of democracy. The BZNS-NP and the BSDP will not allow a shift from one dictatorship to the embryo of another, the leader of the social democrats went on to explain" (DUMA, No. 99, 12 April 1991).

Let us temporarily set aside the question of natural allies.

Let us look at the rest.

The second topic is that of alien and nonalien objectives.

We already checked the objectives of the SDS-Center: to rescue the country from a new dictatorship arising within the SDS, lead the opposition along the only true path, and prevent a civil war, acting sensibly, calmly, and humanely. These objectives are too general to be very appealing. These are abstract formulas that conceal the conscious or subconscious defense of the interests of precisely the ruling party because, on the one hand, firmness, decisiveness, rejection of compromises suitable to the mafiosi and of the lulling tactics of the so-called peaceful transition, anticollaborationism, and principle-mindedness (which are mandatory qualities, among others, of any normal and true opposition!) do not presume in the least or impose lawlessness, revanchism, violence, reactionary actions, or use of undemocratic means. On the other hand, totally inadequate are simply insinuations and magic incantations proving that the "overthrown" organizations that "oppose" the SDS-Center are pursuing objectives that are precisely the opposite of those of the SDS-Center—that is, the introduction of a new dictatorship in the country, leading the opposition along the only possible wrong path and triggering a civil war through unwise, restless, and anti-humane actions.

The appeal calling for the creation of SDS citizenship committees was signed by the heads of the Sofia SDS City Consultative Council, the ASP, the BGI [Civic Initiative Movement], the RDP [Republican Democratic Party], the ODTs [United Democratic Center], the NDZPCh [Independent Association for the Defense of Human Rights], the BDF [Bulgarian Democratic Forum], the DP [Democratic Party], the new SDP [Social Democratic Party], and the KhDO [Christian Democratic Union]. It was supported by the Podkrepa KT [Labor Confederation], three of the most powerful Bulgarian emigre organizations abroad (in the United States, France, and Germany), representatives of other opposition parties and groups, and the overwhelming majority of the regional consultative councils and municipal coordination councils of the SDS.

It would be instructive to determine in greater detail whether the qualifications and abuses generously cast around in the SDS-Center Political Declaration could be justifiably added to the main objectives of the SDS Civic Committee and to the actions of the parties and movements that supported the appeal.

According to the SDS-Center, Main Objective No. 1 (parliamentary elections in June; assumption of political power and implementation of the programmatic ideas of the SDS Civic Committee) should be a model of "left-wing manifestations and pseudorevolutionary actions." It is simply that a "group of aggressive people" will not allow the BSP to rule as it wants for at least another 45 years!

Main Objective No. 2 (trying the main culprits for the national catastrophe; judicial investigation and confiscation of their property) is clearly a kind of "ferocious statement against civil peace," one of those "militant appeals that frighten the people." It would be much better not to frighten the little people who gave Bulgaria its third national catastrophe.

Main Objective No. 3 (confiscation of the property of the heirs of the BCP, the Fatherland Front, the Dimitrov Communist Youth Union, the Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship Society, and the other official organizations and all of their companies; use of the confiscated funds to purchase equipment for the farmers and to aid the socially weak) is clearly defined by the SDS-Center as the latest attempt on the part of the "renegades" to "speak with frantic hatred about what they were," and to "instruct others about democracy." I am not a suspicious person, but I do have the right to suspect that, instead of concerning itself with importing agricultural equipment, the BZNS-NP could, secretly and fraternally, share with the official BZNS the property it stole from the people. I am not biased, but I have the right to doubt that, instead of developing a policy of assisting the socially weak, which is characteristic of social democracy, the BSDP might prefer to carry out an operation with its genetic cousins of the BSP (BCP), the BRSDP [Bulgarian Workers Social Democratic Party] ("narrow" socialists), and others (like the one we already mentioned). Their negative attitude toward the "reactionary" objectives we mentioned so far indicates nothing other than such intentions.

Main Objective No. 4 (returning the national wealth taken abroad) would unquestionably result in bloody excesses, yet, as we have already become aware, the SDS-Center "does not wish bloody excesses."

Main Objective No. 5 (locating, seizing, and making public archive documents; gathering witness testimony regarding committed crimes) convincingly proves that a "major reactionary movement" is taking shape within the SDS. As Dr. Dertliev cautioned us, "without us, gentlemen!" but why, "without them," I am unable to understand to this day!

Main Objective No. 6 (accelerated implementation and strict public control over the processes of privatization and restoration of farmland) is, I presume interpreted by the SDS-Center as the aspiration of small groups and very small forces "to suppress the shoots of democracy."

Main Objective No. 7 (renovation and strengthening of the united opposition and removing compromised or

ineptly imposed members of national and regional SDS leaderships) should be explained as an effort to "manipulate" the organization through the application of the well-known (why should it be so well known to the SDS-Center leadership?) bolshevik tactics of taking it over from within.

There is truly something out of place in this entire story, something difficult to understand. There are three possibilities: We have either not matured enough to determine what the SDS-Center actually wants, or its own leadership has still not clearly established its own wishes, or it knows very well what it wants but does not dare admit it openly, for which reason it is concealing it with trivial democratic jokes.

What is extremely clear, however, is that anyone who officially proclaims the basic objectives of the SDS GK [Civic Committee] to be "slogans and objectives alien to the hundreds of thousands of people who support the SDS" will have to abandon forever the claim of being a member of the opposition, representing the opposition and advertising himself as the true embodiment of the opposition symbols of a political force. It is precisely these objectives that, in reality, reflect the aspirations and wishes of hundreds of thousands of people who support the SDS!

Let us now return to the question of the natural allies.

The creation of the SDS-Center and the immediate aiming of its critical thunder at the organizations that are members of the SDS were welcomed with tempestuous ovations by the leaders, the members, and the sympathizers of the BSP. However, I am far from the idea of issuing Stalin's harsh warning that "if the enemy praises you, it means that you have made a mistake!," nor am I all that far from at least hinting that such may be the case. Let me also voice an assumption that worries me (I already mentioned that I am not biased, but, at this point, I have decided to become so).

Imagine that a bloc of powerful parties is established, parties that:

- a. Begin by imposing chains to block private enterprise, along with heavy tax and legal restrictions imposed on big business (which is so greatly necessary now, given Bulgaria's state of misery!) for the sake of equality, equal start, and equal opportunity—mathematically distributed, while there still is nothing to distribute—and justice.
- b. Become intolerant and scornfully rude toward any individual or organization that does not share their lofty opinions.
- c. Assess the merits and ideological potential of the other parties and movements exclusively on the basis of size of membership.
- d. Have at their disposal the majority of voters (and the decisive aid, let us say, of the Soviet Armed Forces).

Have you imagined this? I have. This already happened once. We first had the Fatherland Front—power from the people and on behalf of the people. This was followed by the elimination of the “tiny,” “small,” “second-rate,” little parties that “disagreed with us, the giants” (naturally, which were fascist and were obstructing the peaceful toil of the people—that is, the “peaceful transition”). Finally, there was destruction, assimilation, or total subordination to the “bigger” Fatherland Front allies by the BCP (pardon me, the BSP). Then, on to the bright future!

It is true that the political situation in Bulgaria and throughout the world is different now. However, the categorical neglect of the lessons taught by history has never led to anything good. It is better to be excessively suspicious today than to be uselessly inspired by impersonal builders of mature democratic socialism tomorrow!

Dr. Dertliev has already warned us: “We are the twin party of the agrarians” (DUMA, No. 99, 12 April 1991). Actually, what would prevent them from very soon finding another sibling—the BSP—and from warning us that they have become triplets?

On the night of 10 June 1990, in a television broadcast from the NDK [People's Palace of Culture], I dared to express my fear that, after a repeat of 1946 (the “first free and democratic elections!”), it would not be entirely impossible for the events of 1947 to repeat themselves. I am convinced now that I was right.

We must not allow this to happen!

The natural allies of the BSDP and the BZNS-NP are within the SDS. These, precisely, are the parties and organizations that are the “targets” of the “titantic” anger and “antifascist” exposures. The atmosphere of intolerance, of mutual attacks and charges, of “appropriation” of the banner and symbols of the SDS, of aspirations toward “antifascist” and “antitotalitarian” messianism, and so forth should be blown away by the wind of understanding, tolerance, and sincere cooperation.

We are united through our common objectives.

Nikolov Replaces BSP Deputy Gotsev in Parliament

AU2205101391 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 May 91 p 2

[Text] Vasil Dimitrov Nikolov, who was in sixth place in the Bulgarian Socialist Party proportional list in the 23d Stara Zagora multiple-candidate constituency, was announced as a member of the Grand National Assembly by the Central Election Commission at its 15 May meeting.

Mr. Vasil Nikolov takes the seat of Mr. Lyuben Gotsev, who has been transferred to a diplomatic post abroad.

The newest Socialist deputy is 51, married, and has two children, a son and a daughter, both students. He is an engineer and general director of Sofia's “Progress” Center of Rapid Application of New Developments.

KNSB Leadership Issues Statement on Property

AU1705192791 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 14 May 91 pp 1-2

[“Text” of declaration by the Executive Committee of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria; place and date not given: “Declaration of the Executive Committee of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria”]

[Text] The question of the state claim for property, which was recently submitted by Minister of Finance Ivan Kostov, is a topical subject of discussion at official and unofficial meetings of the leaders of political and social organizations and is frequently mentioned in the mass media. In a debate on Bulgarian Television that took place on 9 May 1991, Andrey Lukanov, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], mentioned the trade unions as among those organizations that were granted state subsidies in the past. During negotiations with the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, Aleksandur Tomov, deputy chairman of the BSP Supreme Council and deputy prime minister, expressed the opinion that the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] should not be excluded from the state claim related to property. Mr. Tomov expressed the same view in a conversation with Ognyan Krumov, deputy chairman of the KNSB. He added that the independent trade unions own real estate property built with party funds, while the “official trade unions” were granted subsidies from the party budget. A representative of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation also demanded that the KNSB should be included in the property claim.

In connection with such biased statements and attempts to blackmail our organization, the Executive Committee of the KNSB declares as follows:

“1. In accordance with a decision of the KNSB Constituent Congress, the property of the state, of enterprises, and of departments used by former trade unions for recreation or administrative needs has been restored. The total value of the restored property amounts to 188,000,000 leva. On the basis of this property, the ‘Social Recreation’ State Enterprise was officially registered.

“Controversial property still exists over which legal action has been taken and legal procedures are currently under way. The circumstances of this property shall be clarified according to legal procedure. In this context, it is incorrect to resume the question of the restitution of state property by the KNSB.

“The major part of the remaining property was acquired on the basis of membership contributions and donations

amounting to 57,000.000 leva. This amount is included in the Sofia Shareholders Company and in other companies established according to legal procedures. The financial resources that are acquired in this manner are devoted to social assistance and are used for trade union activities and not for political purposes.

"2. Information on the property and financial situation of the KNSB, in accordance with the requirements of the Grand National Assembly Commission, was submitted according to the rules. At the same time, the KNSB granted free access to a group of experts from the Ministry of Finance and fully cooperated with them in investigating the sources of trade union financial incomes and properties, including the use of resources for so-called state functions of the trade union, and for labor protection, recreation, legal defense of trade union members, and cultural activities. As is known, as a result of its investigations, the Ministry of Finance did not find any legal grounds for a state claim against the KNSB.

"3. The property of political parties and organizations acquired on the basis of state funds or by illegal methods should be restored. In this context, the KNSB Executive Council once more expresses its support of the agreement reached by the political forces and of the justified claims of the Ministry of Finance.

"4. After the conclusion of relevant investigations, the KNSB shall submit a claim for nationalized or confiscated trade union property on the basis of the decisions of leading Bulgarian Communist Party organs and on the basis of official state and government documents issued in the period following 9 September 1944."

Editorial note: In our next issue, we intend to publish data on the property and financial situation of the KNSB covering the period from 1 January to 31 December 1991.

Italian Journalist on Papal Assassination Attempt

AU2105145291 Sofia BTA in English 1339 GMT 21 May 91

[Text] Sofia, May 21 (BTA)—An Italian journalist of "CORRIERE DELLA SERA" is convinced that Bulgaria was not involved of her own will in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II. In an interview for the latest issue of the "DEBATI" weekly, Mr. Antonio Ferrari, who has been trying to get at the truth about the attempted murder for ten years, asserts that the plot was too big and complicated to be organized by individual citizens of some countries. There can be no doubt that some large organizations were involved, the interviewee stresses, adding that a part of the truth may be discovered in Bulgaria.

The journalist trusts the intuition of the prominent Bulgarian script-writer Boyan Papazov who told him that some Bulgarian officials behaved suspiciously when

approached for comment on the conspiracy. Mr. Papazov had in mind their "modesty" and reluctance to talk on the subject.

The interview raises the question of the method by which the assailant Ali Agca managed to enter Bulgaria on an Indian passport and to leave the country 30 days later on a Turkish passport. Mr. Antonio Ferrari says that this could not have happened without Agca having a "cover." "I have always believed and still do that the Bulgarian Secret Services are extremely efficient. They are the second best after the Soviet," the journalist pointed out.

In his interview the "CORRIERE DELLA SERA" staffer mentions some curious details concerning one of the Bulgarians charged of complicity in the attempt: Mr. Todor Ayvazov. Ten years ago he was cashier at the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome. On the day Mr. Sergey Antonov, the Bulgarian Airlines office manager in Rome, was arrested, Mr. Ayvazov was to fly from Sofia to Rome. The plane he was supposed to have taken was recalled as it was heading to Belgrade but Ayvazov was not on board. He had simply been late for the flight.

This implies that there were some fears, fears related to Mr. Antonov's arrest, the Italian journalist points out.

He also expressed some doubts about the arrest in Bulgaria of two Italian citizens after the investigation into the attempt started. "At first we thought: How wicked these Bulgarians are to arrest these poor, innocent Italian tourists," Mr. Ferrari says. "But then came the suspicions because this Italian and his wife (Farsetti and Trevisin) did their best to get arrested," the interviewee adds.

There are some other mysterious circumstances surrounding Paolo Farsetti, 43. Four years ago he died in a commonplace traffic accident. Farsetti stopped his car on the hard shoulder of a highway and a heavy-duty truck crashed into it. Nothing is known about the truck or its driver, Mr. Ferrari stressed.

There are also some doubts concerning the personality of the Turkish mobster Bekir Celenk about whom Bulgaria once asserted that he was innocent. Why then was he not allowed to go to Rome, the journalist asks. He rejects the contentions that Celenk's movements in Bulgaria were restricted.

Adding to these mysteries around the papal assassination attempt the recent disclosures made by a former high-ranking official of the Romanian Special Services that the Romanians had known about the plot to kill the Pope six months in advance and had warned the French Secret Services, Mr. Ferrari said: "When we put all this together in the melting pot we get an incredible mixture and, to top it all, someone behind the scenes would not let us get it straight. He may be here, most probably here but he may also be in other countries, including the West," the journalist stressed.

The interview also mentions the meeting between the Pope and Agca after the attack. Maybe this meeting revealed some interesting things, Mr. Ferrari said, adding that former Bulgarian President Petur Mladenov and others had mentioned this meeting to him.

"I think that the Pope knows the truth because he has received information from different countries." The Italian journalist believes that an involvement of the Soviet Special Services and other utmostly delicate things may be the reason why the Pope would not reveal the truth.

The interviewee does not rule out the possibility that if the truth about the papal assassination attempt proves to be an extremely delicate matter, only half of it may be revealed to the public which would stop further investigation.

The "Bulgarian connection" in the papal assassination attempt may be used in the political struggle in this country, Mr. Antonio Ferrari believes. If the opposition uses it, the counter blow will be the "police files" affair, he adds.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Slovak Writer Supports President Havel

91CH0563A Bratislava KULTURNY ZIVOT in Slovak
9 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by Miroslav Derer: "In Defense of Vaclav Havel"]

[Text] One wonders at how many synonyms of the concept of "equality" have sprung up here in connection with the framing of the constitutions: identity, sovereignty, equivalence, and finally independence of Slovakia, which is the real goal and the right interpretation of all the synonyms. And one asks: Would not one word—equality—be sufficient? Does this multitude of words with the same meaning serve only that single goal or does it have another, tactical objective? Where there is no mutual respect and trust between nations even 100 synonyms will not help, and neither will memoranda, state treaties, and declarations, particularly if they are signed by people known to have been servants of the totalitarian regime in the past. Nothing will help when striving for equality so often brings out hate, when irrationality and passions prevail over heart and reason.

Vaclav Havel has already proven many times that he will work for a total equality of Czechs and Slovaks, and in his speech of 14 March he made it clear that "he understands a functional federation to be a federation which serves both its members, is their common undertaking, common task, common property: a federation in which both members are equal and jointly determine their common affairs."

This precise formulation must be clear and understandable to every sensible person. Moreover, it was stated by

a man who enjoys respect and high credibility in all civilized countries of the world. I do not know whether in the past anyone received as many honors, honorary doctorates, and expressions of sympathy as Vaclav Havel. And, if the whole world trusts him, why should not we, Slovaks, trust him? Why do some people so fervently try to find faults in him, cast doubts on what he says, distort and falsely interpret his words? Recently I read that with his alternative of either a "unitary federation or an independent state" he wants to blackmail the Slovaks, and similar suspicions.

It is true that every concept, every word can be interpreted in different ways, but it was precisely Vaclav Havel who on the occasion of the awarding of a peace prize by German booksellers in October 1989 in Frankfurt, still as a dissident, wrote a speech on the topic "A Word about Words." He had an extraordinarily strong impact on the distinguished assembly by his profound philosophy about how often in history words were falsely interpreted, how even the noblest teaching about truth and love, as Christ's teaching is, has been put to bad use. Why should he just now as the president falsely interpret the word "equality" and go back on his promise? Why would Vaclav Havel, who is well known to have been one of the few entirely irreproachable people during the former regime, deceive the Slovaks and lose not only our trust but also his good name in the world?

It can, of course, be said: Good, but Czechs have already deceived us many times. Yes, that is true, many people frankly admit that it happened in the past. Among them is also the current prime minister of the Czech government, Petr Pithart, who in his book *Sixtyeighth* in the chapter "Czechs and the 'comrades from Slovakia'" objectively analyzes the wrongs committed against the Slovaks. Why constantly stress what has tainted our common history? Would it not be more useful to look for what united us, what was positive in our coexistence?

Is it not nonsensical to show distrust and hate toward President Havel of all people? It is generally said about him that his greatest fault is that he is too kind a man who never shows anger, emotions or bitterness although he has experienced so much humiliation and injustice, and who in spite of that does not know how to hate. Everybody who does not want to recognize this fact should read his speech given in Oslo on 28 September 1990 at the World Congress on Hate. In that speech Vaclav Havel said among other things: "A person who hates does not know how to smile, only how to grimace.... Characteristic of the person who hates is a serious face, a propensity to be easily offended, strong words, shouting, total lack of the ability to look at himself and see how ridiculous he is."

We could see during these past several days how true and still very pertinent these words are. Not only did Vaclav Havel verbally analyzed his abhorrence of hate, but that his lack of hate is intrinsic in his being was proven on 14 March on the Square of the Slovak National Uprising when he experienced hate and brutality on his own skin.

A man respected around the world by the most important personages was all of a sudden insulted and humiliated at home by a raging crowd, including children. He managed to rise above it in his own fashion. He certainly uttered a sigh, like the one who once said on the cross to which he was nailed for his philosophy of love: "Forgive them, Father, for they know not what they do."

The demonstration on 14 March vividly illustrated where anger, hate, demagoguery and emotions lead: hate breeds only hate, and we should not then be surprised by the angry reaction from the Czech side. It is, after all, grist for the mill of the Czech chauvinists, of whom there is no shortage either.

But as a rule, everything bad is good for something. Our president, even though some think that he should have avoided the demonstration on the Square of Slovak National Uprising (as if a president could not go whenever and wherever in his own country), thanks to his mental strength practically put an end to the movement which calls itself the movement of "national unity," but which in reality, because of its shortsightedness, is more of a movement of national disunion, of national tragedy. It so happens that most of the nation all of a sudden realized where we would probably get under the guardist standards which so provocatively fluttered over the place to which we gave the name Square of Slovak National Uprising (what a paradox), and whose staffs were used to insult the government delegation and damage their cars. Although our President was being humiliated, he was not at all humbled; on the contrary, he came out of this embarrassing incident, which made our nation the laughingstock of the world, a victor.

Sometimes it seems to me that we are looking for enemies all around us and are tilting at windmills like Don Quixote. Are we not being ridiculous? Would it not be much better to show tolerance, solidarity and political sophistication and believe that Vaclav Havel, who has so sincerely at heart a true friendship and brotherhood of Czechs and Slovaks and a contented, peaceful life in a common homeland in a federation of equals, represents the best chance the Slovaks have?

Moravian Parties Sign Coalition Agreement

*LD1805203991 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1400 GMT 18 May 91*

[Text] The Moravian Rural Party and the Moravian National Party concluded a coalition agreement in Brno today. They will help each other on the basis of their joint program to push through their political goals, which include, among other things, a dignified place for Moravia and its citizens within the future constitutional structure of Czechoslovakia.

Reflections on Treaty With German Federal Republic

*LD1905130291 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
0730 GMT 19 May 91*

[Commentary by Olga Jerabkova]

[Text] I come from a village which was in the Moravian border zone during the war and which was a hiding place for some time for the paratroopers later involved in the assassination of Reinhard Heydrich. Consequently, that village, like Lidice, was to be exterminated and razed to the ground. After three days of waiting and packing whatever luggage they could take with them, the adults were saved from physical liquidation and the children from the concentration camp by a local man, a German called Johann Schmidt. How he did it we were never able to find out. Immediately after the Germans left our village at the end of the war, Johann Schmidt was put in front of a firing squad of so-called partisans—at the last moment, for no reason, without a trial—simply because he was a German.

These few concise sentences are a dry reflection of the still open and unresolved issue of postwar relations between the Czechs and the Germans. It is a question of guilt on both sides, a question which both sides are still somehow trying to avoid. It is a question where the Germans still, 50 years later, confuse result and cause, and one whose injustices the Czechs justify on the grounds that after all there was a war on, we did not start it, we did not want it, and in any case the Germans did not show much quarter either.

Now it appears the time has finally come when we can untie the Gordian knot of our tangled relations once and for all and rid ourselves of the burdensome shadows of the past—or can we do so entirely? My doubts arise largely from the fact that I still do not know exactly what is to be contained in the new Czechoslovak-German treaty of friendship and mutual cooperation now being drawn up, and to what extent its now rather hackneyed title will contain anything that is really new. The talks are being conducted behind closed doors so as to prevent them from being tainted by what has been called external anxiety. Thus the public has only access to patchy information which frequently serves to engender and spread all sorts of rumors and speculation—precisely what the confidential talks were meant to prevent.

Nonetheless the new treaty with Germany is intended to establish the principle of good-neighborly relations in all spheres; economic, environmental, cultural, social, sports, and general human relations and, after the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the potential melting away of NATO, to help provide a system of guarantees for Pan-European security. With this in mind, Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said on a recent visit to Prague that the treaty being drawn up between Czechoslovakia and Germany cannot simply be seen as a bilateral one. We will be concluding similar

treaties with other European countries too, and they will all form part of European security and integration.

I could be satisfied with that, were it not for the fact that I have also learned that the German side at the preparatory talks, though at a high political level, allegedly has no authority to negotiate either on the continuity of the common state border or on property rights issues. This is partly explained by the fact that according to unofficial information from generally well-informed sources, in contrast to the 1973 treaty which is to serve as the basis for the new treaty, the new draft treaty has dropped an important article about the invalidity of the Munich Agreement from the very start. However I am rather confused that there seems to be discussion once again of the difference between the nullity and the invalidity of that so-called agreement—an agreement made about us, but without us.

Similarly, the new Czechoslovak-German treaty is apparently not going to deal with the repeatedly raised claims by the Sudeten Germans either. Poland emphatically held out for and won from the united Germany a treaty on the permanency of the Oder-Neisse border while we, thanks to our moderation, indolence, and perhaps our national characteristic of a tendency to dither, remain empty-handed.

What bothers our people perhaps most of all, however, is the attitude of our leaders to the postwar deportation of Germans from the Sudeten areas. They appear to see it as some sort of retaliation on our part for the sufferings and immense human sacrifices of the war, rather than as a just act in international law on the part of the victorious powers in respect to defeated Nazi Germany. Unless the victorious powers rescind the validity of their decisions in 1945—among them the Potsdam agreement—we surely have nothing whatsoever to discuss with the Sudeten Germans who were deported. Thus we have no reason to take upon ourselves the responsibility for a decision taken at international level on the basis of which the Germans were deported not only from Czechoslovakia, but also from Poland and Austria, for example. They still have not raised any claims against those other countries, only against us.

It is true that the German minority in our country at that time numbered 3 million, but it is also true that 90 percent of them were vociferous in their demands—along with Konrad Henlein—for their *Helm ins Reich* [spoken in German]. They quite deliberately broke up our republic, the common old home country as they nostalgically call it today, without, as far as I know, ever having apologized to us for doing so, in contrast to the gesture of apology made by President Vaclav Havel to Germany—a gesture, however, which a generation of those who can remember simply cannot accept. If we reject the collective guilt of the German nation, then there can be no collective apology on the part of the Czech nation, either, for the acts of individuals or fanatical groups of misguided people. This does not mean, of course, that I condone in any way the postwar brutalities against German women, old men, and children.

The issue for us is not gestures, but much more than that. The issue is that in any kind of talks with strong neighbors, whether in the East or the West, we should always behave as equal partners, as one equal towards another, and not allow the prospect of substantial investment to cause us to make more concessions than are healthy, so that an economically stronger and politically more stable partner will respect us. That, incidentally, was a warning voiced at a Prague public meeting by some of our compatriots from America, because if I am to respect my future partner, I do not want him to behave toward me like a timid and meek supplicant grateful for whatever scraps fall from my rich table.

The West European countries continually assure us of our promising opportunity to enter Europe. This should also be reflected in our talks on the future Czechoslovak-German treaty. The German-Polish talks too were confidential and short on information, but both sides are said to be satisfied with the results. Poland adopted such a forceful and confident approach that even the attacks against it by such radical Sudeten German *Landmannschaft* representatives as the two Herberts—Messrs. Hupka and Czaja—ceased.

As for compensation for the hundreds of thousands of wronged Czechoslovak citizens—former inmates of concentration camps or Czech laborers put to work in Germany during the war—this matter is to be resolved, as in the case of Poland and the Soviet Union, outside of the framework of the upcoming treaty. They say that the German side will grant us one overall sum for the million Czechoslovak citizens, on average 3,000 marks each, including the widows and orphans, with the Czechoslovak state itself actually arranging the allocation. In this context, one circumstance reported by the German side is not without interest, namely that the government of communist Czechoslovakia allegedly renounced the Czechoslovak claims for compensation some time in the early 1970's. The motives for this quite extraordinary step could perhaps be explained in person by the then premier Lubomir Strougal. It is only now that the whole matter is coming to life again.

We already have diplomatic relations, and we are about to sign a treaty, but it is worth recalling that back in 1946 President Benes had the foresight to order German property left behind in our country by the deported Germans to be assessed and recorded. Those records should serve as a basis for documentation which we should draw up just as carefully and thoroughly as that which has been drawn up for us by the Germans, and should include all our claims and the losses we suffered, because given the proverbial thoroughness of the Germans, we should make sure that opposite their solid structure we do not set up a house of cards which will be blown down by the first strong gust of German wind. Otherwise we probably have no option but to trust our

leaders to ensure that the agreed 1991 Czechoslovak-German treaty will be a treaty between two equal partners and that it will become a real foundation both for good-neighborly relations and for our state sovereignty and security.

HUNGARY

Reservations Voiced About Proposed Press Law

Editors' Views

91CH0524A Budapest *MAGYAR HIRLAP*
in Hungarian 2 Apr 91 p 4

[Article composed of interviews with five newspaper editors by Peter Neuman; places and dates not given: "How Should We Regulate a Free Press?"—first paragraph is *MAGYAR HIRLAP* introduction]

[Text] The government has approved the proposed press law's text that is now being reconciled by the six political parties and may soon be presented to the National Assembly's full session. The articles of the constitution dealing with freedom of expression and freedom of the press, repeatedly revised since 1949, would again be amended in the context of this bill. We interviewed several prominent personalities of the Hungarian press to obtain their views on the legislative bill that is being prepared.

Pal Eotvos, chairman and editor in chief of NEPSZABADSAG:

"A press law in Hungary is a sort of necessary evil because there would be no need for such a law in an orderly and developed democracy. But our country lacks the democratic traditions which would automatically provide protection for the media, and simultaneously for journalists as well. In Western democracies, a single passage in the constitution is sufficient to guarantee freedom of the press, because their deeply rooted traditions and their elaborate laws protecting personal rights make that possible. The traffic regulations in Western Europe are probably much thinner than in Uganda, where it is necessary to include also things that in more developed countries are considered natural. The present situation in Hungary is similar regarding a press law.

"Another problem is that suitable codification of personal rights is lacking in our country. According to socialist legal thinking, personal rights are not substantive rights and no price tag can be affixed to them. Consequently, a violation of personal rights could not be equated with a financial loss, and therefore, no damages could be claimed for such a violation. The press law will also have to help gain public acceptance for a change in this attitude.

"In my opinion, imposition of an obligation to provide information is not a pressing problem at present. Incidentally, political pressure, rather than statutory regulation, ought to compel civil servants to provide information. The situation in Hungary also differs in this respect from the situation in developed democracies. In the United States, for instance, medical malpractice statistics are published regularly, and suspicion would immediately be aroused if that did not happen. But in Hungary, where we usually never hear of these statistics, a civil servant would not get into trouble for withholding such information."

Ivan Lipovecz, editor in chief of HETI VILAGGAZDASAG:

"We do not need a press law. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are universal human rights to which the constitution must lend suitable emphasis. Regulation of the so-called public-service media, i.e., radio and television, is another matter. Naturally, laws of a high order must regulate those media because they are state-owned, and also because, due to their nature, they alone are suitable to communicate certain kinds of information. Control by statutory regulation of the media, which are organized as enterprises operating in a market economy, harbors the danger of introducing press censorship, and should therefore be avoided.

"Naturally, anyone who incites racial hatred or reveals state secrets must be punished. But regulations on that ought to be included in the civil code and the criminal code, respectively.

"An obligation to provide information cannot be imposed. The only thing a statute can do is to establish the individual's right to do everything possible in the interest of obtaining the information he is interested in, perhaps even by soliciting help from inquisitive journalists.

"A press law's only use is that it enables the state to curb freedom of the press. Such legislation cannot be a modern civil society's integral part."

Istvan Csurka, chairman of MAGYAR FORUM's editorial board:

"Dissatisfaction is so widespread that the parliament cannot avoid enacting a press law at last. Press employees are split into so many parties and interest groups. Some organizing principle is needed that will create order, at least at the level of generalities. Therefore, it is quite obvious that practice is forcing enactment of this law.

"But it would clearly be unreasonable to expect the law to create order out of chaos with one stroke. Primarily ownership relations, in other words, who the owners are, determine the political orientation and editorial policies of individual periodicals. The law will also have to contain provisions in this regard, but at the same time it follows from the law's very essence that it cannot go

beyond setting certain general rules. For instance, it will have to set the limits of foreign ownership, and to specify the media in which foreign ownership will be banned. The proportion of equity in the Hungarian press now held by foreigners is astonishingly high; assuming, of course, that the money used to buy equity was truly foreign capital, rather than salvaged money. Here, I have primarily the provincial newspapers in mind. The unhealthy conditions at present are placing freedom of the press in jeopardy. The fact that someone has a larger financial interest does not mean that he is necessarily right, yet his standpoint is the one that gets publicity. Perhaps the present situation cannot be changed easily, but what I am talking about now is an ideal press law."

Gusztav Megyesi, senior contributor to ELETESIRODALOM:

"I think it is senseless to enact a separate press law. Freedom of the press as formulated in the constitution is entirely adequate. In addition to this constitutional guarantee, the profession's unwritten laws and the civil code have to control our activity. If we regulate the press by statute, then we could also enact a separate law, for instance, to keep the government in line. Such a government law could prohibit the manipulation of information, and it could regulate, for example, the way officials are selected for appointment. I fully understand the government's policies on appointments. I, too, would prefer to place in top posts individuals with whom I empathize. From where I am sitting, a government law looks desirable. Yet I do not want such a law enacted, because that would be overregulation. There are other, political means to force the government to keep its politics clean.

"Regarding the obligation to provide information, I merely wish to note that if someone is unwilling to make a statement to me as a journalist, then he of course must be prepared to see that fact mentioned in the newspaper. Journalists ought to be protected not by a law, but by their trade union or the MUOSZ [National Federation of Hungarian Journalists]."

Peter Toke, chairman and editor in chief of REFORM:

"The experience of the past two years shows that regulation in the form of a press law is indeed necessary. The press in our country suddenly became free, and we have become 'cheeky'; unethical behavior has become typical. It should be quite natural, for instance, that a newspaper does not attack its employer, the owner because to do so is nonsensical.

"Superficiality, whether well-meaning or malicious, is typical of today's press. When there are disputes, the press rarely presents the views of both sides. That is simply a professional shortcoming. And there still are colleagues systematically wreaking their vengeance. The truth of the matter is that the situation has improved in many respects. We at REFORM are now requesting proof from our sources, because we are responsible for

whatever appears in print. We have not had a single libel case filed against us during the past eight months.

"But a press law also harbors danger, and I fear for the freedom of the press. Everyone has an eye on his own interest, and therefore, it is possible that the government might simply use this law to exert economic pressure on newspapers. Because the government obviously does not want the press in our country to become the sort of fourth estate that it is in the West, it could ruin the papers it dislikes by imposing huge fines on them.

"Journalists ought to be protected from malicious sources of misinformation. We interviewed a member of the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] recently, and he gave us a lot of baloney. After the story was printed, it turned out that he had lied. He intentionally misled the newspaper, but we were the ones who had to bear the consequences."

Legal Adviser's Views

*91CH0524B Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 4 Apr 91 p 4*

["Excerpt" of an interview with Gabor Halmai, the Constitutional Court's legal adviser, by Peter Neuman; place and date not given: "The Legislative Bill in Its Present Form Will Do More Harm Than Good"—first paragraph is MAGYAR HIRLAP introduction]

[Text] For weeks, the press bill now before the parliament has been the subject of heated debate. Many people regard the future press law as arbitrary regulation of the press. Others tend to approve that, finally, the mass media "will be put in their place." We interviewed Gabor Halmai, the Constitutional Court's legal adviser and the founder of the Openness Club, to find out how he regards the legislative bill.

"From the very beginning I have supported the standpoint that regulation of the press is imaginable only in the spirit of the traditional, liberal concept. More or less according to the Anglo-Saxon model, which holds that everything explicitly not prohibited is permissible. This principle applies especially to the print media. I think that the print media, and here I am intentionally making a distinction between the print media and the electronic media, do not require separate statutory regulation in a truly liberal democracy. I subscribed to this same view also a year ago, which is important because the fears some of us, including the Openness Club, among others, were articulating then have become reality in the meantime.

"This press law contains numerous restrictions of opinion in its written form. These restrictions could never even have seen the light of day without the intent to regulate! Of course, this does not mean that freedom of the press is an absolute right, and therefore, no restrictions should be placed on the print media. Restrictions are necessary; the only question is how far they should go and what methods to employ for all this. A

mode of regulation could be imagined under which the various limits of freedom of the press would be added to those existing laws that already contain restrictions. Obviously, the possibility of monopolies emerging both in the print media and the electronic media must be curbed. But we do not need a separate press law for that; it could be accomplished within the framework of the normal competition laws. All that needs to be done is to simply say how many newspapers or radio stations a person may own. But that is a matter for the regulation of competition.

"Many people favor regulation through criminal laws, arguing that this is the only way to stop journalists who are 'taking too many liberties.'

"Limits should be set for freedom of the press both in criminal law and civil law, but on the basis of the factors that constitute the criminal offenses already in our criminal code, i.e., defamation of character, slander, libel, and profanation. If the press commits these offenses, it is liable to prosecution under criminal law even today. The same is true of the limits in civil law. The most important consideration there is the protection of personal rights, and there are regulations for that as well. But we will disregard for the time being the question of whether those regulations are good or bad. I, too, subscribe to the view that, for instance, the present regulations on damages for an injury other than damage to property or a material loss leaves much to be desired. But that is not something for the press law to worry about. It should be solved by amending the civil code.

"The present legislative bill contains unwarranted additional restrictions. The ability of the public prosecutor to order the suspension of a newspaper's publication for any criminal offense, even defamation of character, for instance, exceeds all reasonable bounds. This extremely strict provision borders on violating the very essence of freedom of the press and freedom of expression. The Hungarian constitutional system borrowed just this year the German Constitution's system of regulation, contained in Section 8 of the Hungarian Constitution. That section states that not even an ordinary law can curtail an essential element of a fundamental right, such as freedom of the press! If the legislators still wanted to do so, they would have to enact a constitutional law for that purpose! For this very reason it should be necessary to regulate in greater detail the freedom of expression, and within this separately the freedom of expression in the print media and the electronic media, respectively.

"I wish to note as a matter of curiosity that, in addition to the press bill, a bill to amend the present articles of the constitution dealing with freedom of the press has also been submitted to the parliament. But the proposed amendments contain much less than what is now in the constitution. Namely, they do not include freedom to communicate to the public, an essential element of freedom of the press. One might think that this omission was an oversight by whoever drafted the legislative bill, but the German Constitution explicitly contains that

expression, whereas the proposed Hungarian amendments consistently omit it. Proof that this has been done intentionally is the government decree issued last November which, in an extremely bureaucratic manner, requires licensing for the distribution of newspapers and periodicals outside the Post Office's own distribution system. On the way to becoming a law-governed state, I believe, such restrictions are simply intolerable!

"The legislative bill contains numerous provisions without any sanctions. A good example is so-called journalistic responsibility. As another hair-raising provision, I could mention the one requiring the appointment of a chief of the editorial office! I think that if there is universal freedom of the press, and within it freedom to found newspapers, then it is the sovereign right of the newspaper's founder to appoint a chief of the editorial office. To prescribe this by statute is not only unnecessary, but also an infringement of the founder's rights.

"For all of the reasons outlined above, I believe that the legislative bill in its present form will do more harm than good. Naturally, it contains all of the 'advantages' by which many people hope to curb 'the unruly journalists of an unruly press.'

"Moreover, those 'advantages' are borrowed from the very press law that every democratic party sharply condemns as a legacy of party-state legislation. Therefore, in my opinion, the Hungarian parliament would be doing much more for freedom of the press if it simply rescinded the 1986 press law and amended other laws where appropriate."

POLAND

Journalists, Activists Form New Party

*LD1805203691 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish
1300 GMT 18 May 91*

[Text] Journalists and local self-government activists linked to the WSPOLNOTA magazine gathered today at a founding meeting of the Congress of the Self-Governing Republic [Kongres Rzeczypospolitej Samorządnej] Party. Documents are being prepared for the new party's congress, which is to be held at the end of June.

Social Democracy's Economic Program Assessed

*91EP0447A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 17,
27 Apr 91 p 4*

[Article by Jerzy Kleer: "Social Democracy's Economic Program: Third Way"]

[Text] The Chief Council of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] published a socioeconomic program entitled "Poland of Progress, Law, and Democracy." It does constitute quite an event since political parties do not indulge in publishing concise economic program proposals.

1.

The program was formulated to contest the government's plan. Among other statements in the program, we can read the following: "Priority is given to the human being, his needs and potentials. This is expressed in subordinating...his instruments and mechanisms to social stabilization, and in preventing any lowering of the standard of living and an unjust income differentiation.

"The government program puts forth as priority the stiff principle of the economization of life; subjecting its values to profits which an individual gains from participation in economic life. Social goals are considered a result of the functioning of free market mechanisms....

"The SdRP proposes a mechanism designed to absorb socially negative effects of free market activities, especially from the point of view of the poorest, without removing the basis of a free market economy. Among the proposed shock absorbers are: state interventionism, equal rights for various forms of ownership, and different management methods for different forms of ownership.

"The government program proposes a free market mechanism without shock absorbers, which at the same time does not differentiate enterprises in terms of their implementation of socioeconomic goals...

"Our alternative, finally, has a different approach to the amount of time needed to transform the Polish economy into a free market. The SdRP favors a longer period which will allow an evolutionary transition. We believe this is the only way to reduce economic and social losses, and prevent pathologies and crises.

"In its assumption that the period of transition should be short, a few years at the most, the government is guided by populist aims. The government's program does not take into account the enormous losses that are unavoidable in such an undertaking."

2.

The SdRP document contains many pertinent remarks on and correct criticism of the government's present economic policy. They are not really new revelations. They can be found, although not in such a comprehensive form, in documents of other organizations and parties. The remarks are contained in the chapter entitled "Anticrisis Relief Program." They are put forth in seven points. I will present them in a summarized form, without the wider justification included in the text:

- The excess wage should be abolished.
- Currency rates of exchange should be an essential lever to pull the country out of the economic crisis and to reorganize the economy. Instead of a fixed zloty rate, a flexible one has to be introduced.
- It is necessary to enlarge the scope of credits on preferential terms for investments, used selectively in chosen sectors of the economy.

- There should be major changes in the tax system. The authors raise doubts as to a quick introduction of value-added tax because it would stimulate cost inflation. They recommend simplified forms of taxing small businesses and they propose a change in State Budget revenue sources by increasing turnover taxes on goods of greater consumption.
- There is need for immediate changes in the policy of restructuring state industry. These changes should facilitate a fuller utilization of credits offered to Poland by the World Bank and stimulate a greater interest in industry that had specialized in export to USSR.
- An immediate change in state policy regarding the unemployed is proposed. This policy should endorse actions aimed at increasing supply and stimulating the main factors of economic growth.
- It is requisite to protect the prices of consumer staples and basic services for the poorest.

Many of these postulates are correct and they may be found, as I have already mentioned above, in numerous statements critical of government policies made by organizations and parties that stand far apart from the political options of the SdRP. There is no doubt that some points of the stabilization program, introduced at the beginning of 1990, require considerable modifications. Its assumptions have not proved to be correct. A live economic and social organism is not plasticine which may be shaped according to a theoretical model. We have realized that not only from the Polish experience, but also from the experience of other postsocialist countries. The experience of former East Germany has become a model by now; the transformation of its economy cannot be brought about quickly and painlessly despite the massive aid from West Germany.

3.

The part of the program that criticizes details of the current government policy does not raise serious objections. In the rest of the document, however, I have noted four points drawn from assumptions that may probably be adroitly proved to be true at academic seminars, but may prove rather unrealistic, even totally unrealistic, if put to test in a real process of economic transformation.

The first problem deals with the time span needed to create a market economy. It has to be admitted that the process will not be completed in a short period of just a few years. At the same time, it is wishful thinking to expect that rationing of free market in small doses is the best way to achieve it. The economic history of many countries proves that any option rooted in dual mechanisms, ruled by different logic and different principles, does not portend the least painful way to a new economic system. The old argument whether to cut the dog's tail piece by piece or the whole at one time, seems to have been decided in favor of a one-time operation.

We can perceive two stages in the process. The first one must be a rapid introduction of a certain amount of

market solutions in order to ensure a "great push." A gradual dosage of the market, specially in the introductory stage, will only cause a dilution of market principles. They would become practically quite ineffective, or totally ineffective. The second stage is the period when market principles become universal and also change people's mentality from socialist to market. This stage, obviously, will last much longer, for several years.

In this context, it is necessary to clarify a significant point of the argument referring to an active role of the state in modern economy. Nobody negates the need for the state and its services to stimulate various economic processes. It is too often forgotten, though, that state interventionism in Western countries follows market rules, while in the transformation of a command economy the state only too often falls back on the old arbitrary administrative solutions. Until the state administration adopts fully market principles, it cannot be granted too much power in the economic sphere. That is why minimizing the timespan of the first stage is so important in the process of transformation of the old system.

Here we come to the next issue, which is the cost of the transformation. So much has been written on the subject that any other remark may sound banal. Regardless of that, I will venture to express two. Until now, all prognoses, even those most pessimistic, have in fact minimized the costs of such a transformation. The problem is that these costs cannot be distributed during a long period of time, because, among other reasons, one of the prerequisites for creating a market economy is its opening to the world. This in turn requires a developed infrastructure, all kinds of services and institutions which do not exist at all in a socialist system. Furthermore, a slow process of joining the world economy may only mean extending the distance to developed countries. Besides that, there is no proof that stretching the process in time will minimize the costs. I believe personally that it will considerably maximize them. The above does not mean that softening mechanisms should not be introduced where it is feasible.

The third issue concerns transformation of ownership. I have doubts regarding the following statement: "The choice of an appropriate form of ownership of an enterprise should be made by its employees." There is no reason to believe that employees will make the most appropriate choice of proprietorship of a particular enterprise. It seems rather obvious that employees will usually opt for a solution to ensure their highest profits in the shortest time. They will be less concerned with a strategy geared to a long-term success and not to immediate profits. Whether employees should be totally relieved of having a say in ownership changes is a different matter. It is not possible, however, to accept such categorical statements as the program puts forth.

The last issue deals with the social market economy. According to the program, "The social market economy should be based on the following principles:

- "Equality of rights for all forms of ownership, with a gradual withdrawal of the public sector from participation in the economy, proceeding with the economically weakest industries.
- "State activity oriented towards socioeconomic development and the most effective ways to reach it.
- "Active social policy.
- "Different methods of enterprise operation to suit the particular form of ownership.

"This is exactly what is meant by 'the third way.' It is different from the two doctrinal solutions: the centrally planned command-allocation economy and the orthodox free market economy of capitalism...."

I have a variety of doubts regarding the above statements. The first one is of a theoretical nature. In modern developed countries the social market economy is becoming more and more common, to indicate such examples as the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Germany etc. Reaching this type of economy, however, requires at least two conditions: universality of market principles and a high enough economic level. None of these conditions exists in Poland. It is certainly true that the end result to be reached eventually by Poland is a social market economy. It cannot be reached, however, by combining the old system's institutions and instruments with a gradual introduction of market rules. It would be a mixture of system solutions which would not guarantee success. It is necessary to go first through a stage, short-lived perhaps, of liberal economy. It is a difficult stage, painful and costly, but without it there is no guarantee that the future social market economy will rest on a sound basis.

Mazowiecki on Democratic Union, Elections

91EP0448A Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 17,
27 Apr 91 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki, chairman of the Democratic Union, by Adam Krzeminski; place and date not given: "Clean Boxing"]

[Excerpts] [Krzeminski] We were happy to learn that you had started the campaign by visiting various cities and meeting with your supporters from the presidential campaign as well as your opponents. It is rare in Poland for a politician to come back so quickly after a failure. How do you estimate the support for the Union after the last series of meetings?

[Mazowiecki] I have had many meetings, having visited already twenty different places. They were very interesting, and sometimes quite heated. The Democratic Union has a lot of supporters, although I have not really started the election campaign yet. For the time being, I am organizing the Union in the field. The important thing is that people come, speak up, often attack me and ask about various matters related to my prime minister-ship, about the removal of the Soviet army, about the "thick stroke," about the economic reforms....

[Krzeminski] I do not really want to go back to those matters because you have explained them on numerous occasions in the press and on the radio. I would rather like to speak of the future, yours and your party's. Who are the people in Poland B [provincial towns] that come to the Union meetings. In big cities they were usually the intelligentsia, who often experienced your failure as their own.

[Mazowiecki] Various people come; intelligentsia, of course, but also workers and farmers, and quite a few young people, business people; those who support the Union and me personally, but also opponents very often quite belligerent. There are also those who are looking for a new political orientation, those undecided yet or disillusioned already with whoever they had supported before. They are obviously expecting something from the Union and from me since there is no obligation to come to a meeting with Mazowiecki.

[Krzeminski] We are facing elections. This will not be a battle between two or three candidates for the highest post in the country, but a fight among parties and political groups for parliament seats. Do you have a tentative idea about the Union's possible political alliances in a future coalition, or is it still quite foggy to everyone?

[Mazowiecki] I am counting on the voters who will not be seduced by just anything; any promise, or any demagogue. I am sure that this is a large electorate and that such voters are in all the social strata. We are glad to see the emergence of the middle class and we would like to attract it. We can talk about future coalitions when the right time comes. At the moment there is some fog, because it is not apparent what import various parties and groups carry.

[Krzeminski] Some polls are quite favorable to you. The Union has the top rating in Katowice Voivodship, second place in Gdansk. You have a good percentage, considering the present number of competing parties. Does it seem likely that you will retain your November votes?

[Mazowiecki] I feel obligated to my voters and I try to be faithful to them. I hope that I and the Union have their reciprocity. We will also try to gain new supporters. Considering the new developments, our ideas will gain strength. We will further develop and fortify them. That is why I travel around Poland, to match our proposals with people's expectations. Relying on polls is always risky, while these meetings are encouraging. We want to go out to people as far as possible, also to those who did not vote for me in the presidential elections but may sympathize with the Union now. This requires a lot of work and we are doing it. The Union itself will be a pluralistic party, internally differentiated but having a common vision of a democratic order. It is a party that wants continued introduction of market economy. We present both the opportunities it offers as well as the hard work it requires to make use of them. We will not

sacrifice responsibility for the sake of demagoguery, which we consider disrespectful to the voters.

[Krzeminski] The presidential election failure caused a split in your camp.

[Mazowiecki] Yes, but let us not exaggerate it. The most serious split is Bujak's position. He has a right to it. It is a pity, nevertheless, that I learn about his objections later than the press. Let us look ahead, however, and not backwards. The Union is growing. We are united by the same philosophy of action. We do not build our future on discord but on reconstructing a national understanding in the most important matters. A lot of people in Poland think similarly. These are the people who share our vision of democracy and the fact that political actions and promises have to be backed by responsibility. From the meetings and the correspondence I get, I know that great many people share our opinion that Poles must come to an understanding on the most important issues, not quarrel and fight using any means available. There is a very clear desire for concentration and agreement and not splitting and arguing.

[Krzeminski] Your situation is rather difficult, because the present government is continuing your policy in two thirds, or even more, at least, in economy and foreign relations. You cannot, therefore, present too forcefully an alternative program in the coming campaign, especially because the government is having certain successes. They are to a degree also your successes, although you are not the one reaping them. How will you carry on your campaign in this situation?

[Mazowiecki] A few words of remembrance. When we created the program of transition to a free market economy and to stop inflation, we knew that it would not be easily accepted by people and that the government would not always enjoy support. We knew that support would vacillate, or even go down. It was essential to maintain enough support until the emergence of the first positive results of the reform. What followed, all that pushing, proved to be politically destructive. It undermined the trust in reforms before they could bring positive results. During that playing for power, the interest of the country was played against. This is the greatest loss, not the fall of my government.

[Krzeminski] It is true, the pushers had a Pyrrhic victory. They installed their candidate in the Belvedere and started to exist as a party but polls are not favorable to them. On the other hand, they are favorable to the government.

[Mazowiecki] Yes, but the government, while continuing our policy, should remember (and that is something that it does not always do) that the fruits, for instance the reduction of debts, did not appear after a telephone call, but had been ripening for the whole previous year, thanks to a very consistent policy. As far as electoral programs are concerned, it will be of great import whether they become instruments of attack and destruction, as it happened during the presidential campaign, or

an attempt to arrive at right solutions for the future development of Poland, as well as an introduction of corrections and new elements.

[Krzeminski] Which elements? Would you want a discussion on correcting the government so soon, after barely three months?

[Mazowiecki] My government, if it existed, would also have to consider such corrections. The question is, however, whether we want to go on in constructing our economic and political system, or to undermine what we have achieved. We should not raise our voices for effect only.

[Krzeminski] You are bound to wait then?

[Mazowiecki] Ability to wait is a great asset in politics. Quite a few could make use of it. It is not a matter of waiting, however, but of presenting a program for Poland rather than just for a party. It would be no great achievement to criticize the present government, bedraggle it and remove it, and then to seat oneself on top of the ruins. This is not the Union's aim. We want power for the sake of something more than power itself. We have already had that, we know how hard it is. Now we want the great debate on the future of Poland. Parties should present their views of the country's future and not mirages only to attract votes. This would be a constructive move forward instead of another undermining tactic.

[Krzeminski] You intend to conduct a very intellectual campaign. At the same time, we have boxers on the ring who speak little of the country's future but a lot about themselves and the way they will handle their opponents. Usually, campaigns run around a few slogans: thick stroke, soviet tanks, excess wage tax. It is hard to say whether this fall we will have a civilized discussion on the future of the country or rather brutal American-style wrestling.

[Mazowiecki] Using your sports comparisons, I can say that we do not intend at all to take off our boxing gloves, but we want clean boxing which will not destroy the ring. I am disturbed, therefore, by the attitudes, spreading more and more, that in order to win one has to be maximally irresponsible during the campaign. This is an outcome of the previous campaign, a wrong and dangerous one. If we adopted it, the prognosis for the country would be bleak. There could be nothing simpler for the Union than presenting a list of promises from the presidential election campaign and put it on the table like a check to be cashed. In terms of campaign technique it would be very easy, but we cannot endlessly go on undermining government's support which is already rather weak.

[Krzeminski] The other side, Center Accord, does not have such problems. They have already come forth with the argument: this government is not us, we did not opt for this but for a real acceleration; it did not happen because Lech betrayed you, so let us go on and finish the

job. This way the government will again find itself in the midst of party games. Again the reform will be threatened by party demagogues of quick gains. At the same time you would like to have a campaign...

[Mazowiecki] ...which is responsible. Does it have to be demagogic and populist? No, it doesn't. It may be live and heated, but rational, concentrated on reasonable programs for Poland, presented in a fashion understandable to everybody because everybody's vote will count. Those who choose to play with irrational emotions will give proof, I repeat myself here, of disrespect for the voters and of treating the country as a plaything.

I believe that nobody in Poland would want to lose what we have achieved for the last several months. I also believe that there is awareness of something having gone wrong during the presidential campaign, of something important having been lost. It was the loss of social acceptance of a long-term effort to implement the reforms. Appetites were stimulated for immediate gratifying effects, while gratification was not possible. To counter the disillusionment, images of an enemy or opponent have been created, someone to fight with since he is either guilty or too slow. This is a dangerous game and a perilous illusion. There is no way to an instant economic miracle, even if all the supposed enemies are dead and buried.

The feeling of social solidarity was also lost, a feeling indispensable at moments of great historic changes. At the same time, the urgent problems we are facing call for this solidarity because they affect all of us. To give an example, what are the future prospects of state enterprises, of the whole state industry. We are turning to privatization, of course, but it will not eliminate state industry immediately. It has to find a way for its future existence, because for a long time to come it will weigh heavily on our economy and supply jobs to millions of people. We have to give very careful consideration to ways of adjusting state enterprises to the mechanisms of free market economy. There are similar problems in agriculture. We have to stop arguing about minimum prices and move on to other issues which are not less important, for instance, such as building an infrastructure in agricultural areas. [passage omitted]

[Krzeminski] Do you see a possibility of creating a people's party similar to the CDU [Christian Democratic Union] in Germany, which combines various tendencies, from national to liberal and even left; a party consolidated some time ago by Adenauer, and today led by Kohl?

[Mazowiecki] I believe that foreign or historical models do not fit the Polish situation. The present situation in Poland is still unclear, I mean, the emergence of parties and their outreach. There are different opinions, from those that parties are altogether superfluous because they will be replaced by citizens movements, to those that parties have already been created and consolidated. I do not know if a "people's party," which you ask about, has

already appeared. May be there are some beginnings of it, but it does not only depend on party structures but on the emergence of a middle class. We are also trying, of course, to initiate contacts with Christian-democratic parties, and with others. Our political scene, however, is shaped by other divisions than those in the West. In Germany the political scene was shaped according to ideological divisions, while in our country...

[Krzeminski] ...according to personal ones? According to political genealogy?

[Mazowiecki] Differently. First of all, we do not know if present divisions are permanent or temporary. The same tendencies, just varying in intensity, can be found in various camps. Right now the original divisions dominate, those from before June 1989 and the presidential elections. The latter were not just personal either, they related to more substantial issues.

[Krzeminski] Do you mean a division between "Walesa's people" and "Mazowiecki's people," or a division according to techniques of fighting for power, and eventually according to two concepts of democracy?

[Mazowiecki] You are asking whether in those days the crux of the matter was two concepts of Polish democracy, or merely a social electoral technique. To me the essential question is what type of democracy we want to create in Poland. The presidential campaign did not give a reply to this question. It is still open.

[Krzeminski] I will ask it in a different way. Who do you think has a greater opportunity, power pragmatists or ideologists, Solidarity spiritual leaders? Can you find a common language with Walesa today?

[Mazowiecki] The Solidarity camp divided itself last fall. It was painful to everyone. Although it was understandable that from such an enormous movement as Solidarity various political groups should emerge, the way in which it happened caused a lot of damage. Today we would like Solidarity, conceived as a union movement, to respect the various political preferences of its members. Regarding relations among various movements that emerged from Solidarity, the problem is much more complicated. I was asked at one of my meetings if another Solidarity alliance was possible, understood as alliance between the Union and Center Accord. I answered that such a possibility is not in sight at present, but I would be glad if we could have something like a nonaggression pact, the achievement of which will be both psychologically and politically very difficult. The matter of my attitude toward Lech Walesa is quite different. In my personal attitude toward him there have been no psychological inhibitions. Right now, however, it has become a matter of an attitude to the president in the situation of our common new democracy. Walesa as president has to be respected by all, and we respect him as well. He may rest assured of our loyalty during his presidency. The problem, however, remains whether the president performs his functions in such a way that he stands above all divisions, or takes a

stand in interparty disputes. From the point of view of our common good, the president should represent all that unites us, and stand as an institution of a higher rank. When, however, key posts in offices connected with the president are given to one party only, and if this post distribution has a bearing on the conduct of these offices, the president loses his above-party position. [passage omitted]

Various Political Parties Hold Meetings

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18 May 91*

[Text] Warsaw, May 18—As political parties and organizations in Poland start getting ready for parliamentary elections, many groupings held their meetings today.

The two-day debates of the second national conference of the Liberal-Democratic Congress KLD started here today, with about 150 delegates representing the 2,000-member party taking part. Chairman of the Liberal-Democratic fraction of the Democratic Party [SD] Tadeusz Bien, taking part in the debates, announced that his fraction quit the Democratic Party, and called on all fraction members to join the Liberal-Democratic Congress.

The KLD delegates elected 34 out of 40 members of the main board and four out of seven members of the party's political council. The vacancies had been reserved for representatives of new circles of this developing party.

The delegates elected Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, hitherto chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Congress, and Minister of Ownership Changes Janusz Lewandowski, Senator Zbigniew Rokicki, and chairman of the National Economic Chamber [and] Sejm Deputy Andrzej Arendarski members of the political council.

Chairmen of the KLD main board and the political council are going to be elected tomorrow (May 19). The KLD board drafted the party's election program.

Participants in the conference received a letter with greetings from Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Representatives of foreign delegations spoke during the conference. Among them were the head of the liberal fraction of the European Parliament Eduardo Punset of Spain and representative of the German SPD [Social Democratic Party] party Juergen Koppelin. The delegates read out a letter with greetings from the Irish Progressive Democrats Party. Representatives of the Swedish Liberal Party, the Italian Republican Party, and the British Conservative Party are also present at the conference.

As another development today, Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski told a unionist meeting in Bydgoszcz today that Solidarity goes to the elections "as a vigilant union that guarantees democratic reforms in Poland. So far, no force has emerged that could replace us in this respect."

Meanwhile, an open organizing committee of the Conservative Party came out today for a Christian electoral alliance at a meeting here today. The need to expand the alliance by peasant parties was also raised.

Members of the committee voiced support for the law on legal protection of child unborn.

The committee set up a 10-person political council of the Conservative Party, with biochemist Stanislaw Plewako of Warsaw becoming chairman of the council. Krzysztof Rafal Gorski is leader of the party.

"The erroneous right-wing economic program pursued over the past two years brought about the collapse of the economy and posed a threat to the foundations of the working people's living conditions," says a resolution of the central executive committee of the Polish Socialist Party [PPS] adopted today.

The first conference of the Social-Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP] here today criticized the current situation in Poland, saying that political, economic, and social crisis is going on and a lot shows that it will even get worse in the future. The meeting spoke about people's great disappointment with the rule of the present team. One speaker claimed that the entire presidential campaign was a game of appearances without a concrete program and rational changes and that the concept of acceleration resulted in destruction.

The SdRP has over 60,000 members and eight percent of them are below 29 years of age.

Also here, a party called the Congress of the Self-Governing Republic was set up today during a founding meeting with the participation of representatives of local self-government from all over Poland.

The aim of the party is to strengthen local self-government as an autonomous system of public authority and efficient executor of the state economic policy. The first congress of the party is to be held in Bydgoszcz on June 29-30.

YUGOSLAVIA

Debate on Promulgation of 3 Presidency Members

91BA0715B Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 18-19 May 91 p 6

[Article by D. Vucinic, V. Vignjevic, J. Kesic, and I. Torov: "The Decision Passed, the Dilemma Remained"]

[Text] While they waited for the joint session of both chambers of the assembly to proclaim three new members of the SFRY Presidency—from Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo—after the repeated attempts at agreement and consultations concerning the assembly leadership, the "unemployed" delegates wiled away their

time in the restaurant and corridors of the parliament with forecasts of the outcome of the crisis in the collective chief of state.

The gossip was that it had been agreed at some important place that the new members of the supreme Yugoslav government from the two provinces and one republic would be elected without great trouble in this "corrective installation." However, that did not happen. The delegates of Slovenia in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and 14 Albanian delegates from Kosovo submitted an amendment to the effect that Sejdo Bajramovic not be proclaimed a member of the Presidency. The proposal was substantiated with the same line of argument as the last time—until the decision of the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia on the justifiability of dissolving the Assembly of Kosovo and the election of Bajramovic by the Serbian Assembly, the installation cannot take place. Unless the amendment was adopted, they warned, they would leave the session. Neither the Slovenes nor the Albanians disputed the nomination of the members from Montenegro and Vojvodina.

Following speeches by 12 delegates, the chair put the amendment to a vote. Among the members of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces, 30 were against, 18 for, and six abstained. In the Federal Chamber, there were 85 against, 31 for, and 17 abstentions. The amendment did not pass. Gligorijevic then said that all three members of the Presidency were elected. The delegates from Slovenia and a group of Albanians reacted by walking out of the session. In that general "fuss," Djuro Vidmarovic (Croatia) asked for his colleagues to be given a recess for consultations. The chair did not honor the request, and so the delegates of Croatia also left the chamber. The members of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] from Bosnia-Herzegovina followed them out.

The president of the federal parliament then invoked Article 322 of the Federal Constitution, under which the assembly is required to solemnly proclaim election of members of the Presidency and make it public. Gligorijevic read (made public) the composition of the collective chief of state, including the three members from Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. Vlado Pandzic, however, warned that such a decision was unconstitutional, because some delegations had entirely left the meeting and he spelled out the conditions for the proclamation. Irfan Ajanovic, vice president of the Assembly, agreed that the conditions did not warrant the proclamation of the members and publication of the membership of the Presidency. Milisav Milenkovic (Serbia) reacted from the bench, interjecting: "That is not true. We have adopted the agenda." The president of the assembly ended the dispute by proclaiming a recess "of 20 minutes before the proclamation," he emphasized.

After a two-hour recess, which had been announced as a recess of 20 minutes, Slobodan Gligorijevic, president of the Yugoslav Assembly, informed the delegates of both

chambers that Zdravko Sevo, who was present in the meeting of presiding officers, would give them "a brief explanation and report." At that point, Sevo quoted the last sentence which President Gligorijevic uttered before the recess, but after the result of the vote on the Slovenian amendment. Sevo said that Gligorijevic had said: "I announce and take note that the following agenda has been established—proclamation of the newly elected members of the SFRY Assembly from SR [Socialist Republic] Montenegro, SAP [Socialist Autonomous Province] Vojvodina, and SAP Kosovo and announcement of the composition of the SFRY Presidency."

It is proposed that the meeting continue from where it left off. That was what Zdravko Sevo said, and then Gligorijevic [added]: "That means taking the solemn oath."

At that point, there was not a single delegate from Slovenia in the chamber. Nor any Albanians from Kosovo. There were delegates from Croatia, but most of them stood up at these words from President Gligorijevic and left the chamber. The impression is that they were all caught by this accelerated proclamation ceremony.

But then everything presumably was according to the agreement: Branko Kostic, Yugoslav Kostic, and Sejdo Bajramovic repeated in union after President Gligorijevic the solemn oath, full of pledges to the struggle "for brotherhood and unity," "development of a socialist self-managed society," "achievement of the power of the working class," and so on.

This solemn act ended with applause from those present. Those who were absent protested off by themselves, in the offices of their delegations....

Changes in Democratic Alliance of Kosovo

91BA0717A Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA
(supplement) in Serbo-Croatian 18-19 May 91 p 7

[Interview with Fadilj Hisaj, member of the Presidium of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], by Milos Antic; place and date not given: "Until Heads Cool Off"—first paragraph is NEDELJNA BORBA introduction]

[Text] Following its first assembly, the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo [DSK], the largest political party rallying Albanians, quite unexpectedly became a topic of various discussions and, indeed, disputes in Kosmet. BORBA tried to find what it was actually all about from an interview with Fadilj Hisaj, a newly elected member of the DSK Presidium, by profession a director in the theater and theatrician, who in the assembly delivered a speech that caught the attention not only of the delegates, but of the general public as well.

The Theater in Politics

[Hisaj] Changes are a natural track for any party. The secrecy of the election, the first such election in Kosovo's political life, brought into the foreground of political life individuals who had not previously been involved in politics, but who were present in the public life of Albanians. Those changes can be interpreted only as a consequence of the first democratic elections within a party.

[Antic] To what can you personally attribute your election to that leadership?

[Hisaj] Perhaps it was some of my public statements or analyses in some of my essays printed in our journals. Or because there is so much theater in present-day politics. At times the politics has become so theatrical that the voters thought that I could understand these theatrical constructions of present Serbian policy.

[Antic] It is said that that leadership is made up mainly of those individuals who do not, to say the least, have their own opinion, but have arrived there solely because they are ready to obey. What do you say about that?

[Hisaj] Rugova is a modern type of liberal leader, and collaborators of that kind are the last thing he needs. The stories you mention, I believe, have been started tentatively, if they were actually started, and their purpose was to artificially devise a fog (on the stage) in order to arouse doubt and weaken the positions of the undisputed leader not only of this party, but in general of the Albanian people in Yugoslavia. This is proven by a recent poll conducted by BOTA E RE. I believe the DSK leader will have in the present leadership a compact team of capable individuals who have no leadership ambitions, but whose thinking is politically mature.

[Antic] We heard your speech in the assembly. You were one of those who have your own opinion about everything and you stated it loud and clear. Will that be your approach in the presidium as well?

[Hisaj] I will, of course, stand up for my opinion, and I will attempt to bring it into line with the policy of this party, which I fully support. The Albanian people, thanks to the DSK and other parties, having freed itself of the "awe" of the Stalinist ideology in the rule of the LCY [League of Communists in Yugoslavia] in Kosovo, is also freeing itself very rapidly of populism and is now becoming aware of its real strength, political power, and significance as an important and perhaps one of the decisive factors in peace and prosperity in this Balkan hell. So the policy of caution at every step, although it may seem to some like a turtle's crawl, is for me and many others in the present circumstances the only real policy in which I believe. The Albanian people will no longer be drawn so easily into playing the role of a scapegoat in historical upheavals such as the present one. But we are also prepared for the long haul. For the impatient, for people who are politically blind, who would like to test and rattle weapons, in order to resolve

this situation at the moment as soon as possible, our option may be alien. Unfortunately, this option, which is supported by a majority of our population, still does not have its followers in Serbia. We will go on waiting patiently for the hotheads to cool down so that then the discussion which is inevitable will really make sense.

A Period Without Vassals

Political capital cannot be made in the new European division of the balance of power with violence and state terrorism. [Nor can it be brought about by] bringing about a crisis in the Balkans artificially so that Europe will consent, as it did in similar times, at the Berlin Congress in 1878, or in 1919 at the Paris Conference, to yield to Serbian pressure and allow a new domination of Serbian policy in the Balkans. However things develop, I believe that it will never again be possible to create a vassal mindset in the Albanian people. It is a great illusion and deception of the Serbs, themselves, living in Kosovo that they will be guaranteed the status of the ruling nation over a population that is 90-percent Albanian. That madness will cost all of us together a few more decades of political and economic stagnation and isolation in Europe, and we will be condemned to live for a long time yet in a state of war without waging war. Because we are aware on both sides of the consequences of such a step. At this point, we have already adapted to life under these circumstances while we wait for a new frame of mind on the part of the Serbs with whom we have been at war or at peace, and we will have to live together as neighbors. We will also wait for a new balance of power; it is inevitable, just as new arrangements are inevitable. Serbia's present policy toward the Albanians is a canker which is doing its greatest damage, in my opinion, to the culture and civilization of the Serbian people itself. I believe that we will not be [as published] a curse to each other for a long time. The hatred planted in the souls of these two peoples is too irrational. We in the DSK will be striving to rescue our people from that cancerogenic enmity, from that plague. Whatever the thinking of Serbian politicians, and whatever studies are written by Serbia's political academicians about "purging" Kosovo of Albanians, we will still be here in the next century, just as we have been here from ancient times to the present day. Politicians who have an ambition within their term of office to broaden their state may, as a consequence, have to face in the end only the destruction of that state.

[Antic] You said in the assembly that the Albanian people should be depoliticized, but politics and politicians politicized. What did you mean by that?

[Hisaj] I was referring there to freeing the people of daily political life, which with good reason can be difficult and sometimes insupportable. Politicization of the Albanian people has been imposed by Serbian policy. The struggle with political weapons, which are the only ones in the balance of power that realistically exists, in the struggle that is possible, has resulted in political emancipation of

the Albanian masses, and a raising of political consciousness which has made of the Albanians a political force that thinks and acts in a synchronized way. Depoliticization of the Albanian people will, in my opinion, create more political space for activity under the new circumstances, which are changing with lightning speed and which not everyone is able to face. The preconditions and conditions have now come about for political professionalism, but not the kind we had under the rule of Kosovo's Bolshevik elite. Those who engage in politics, when they get a mandate from the voters, are also thereby being given a mandate to shape in political terms and reconcile day-to-day needs and day-to-day policy to meet the main goal.

The Flight of Those Who Have "Not Been Driven Out"

[Antic] Do you believe that in recent years the Albanians have been excessively misused for political purposes?

[Hisaj] On the contrary, they have been misused by Serbian rule for the purpose of total pacification. In recent years, they have been misused in order to promote Milosevic as a new Serbian leader with a medieval image who will present to the Serbian people the position of the ruling nation in the Balkans. The Albanians were probably chosen as the first victim of that advancement, as the first conquered "enemy" in the battle to create the new Serbian empire. As for the workers, we all know here that in so doing Serbia wanted to rid the factories of Albanians. People without jobs and food, it went without saying, would flee Kosovo "without being driven out," following their stomachs in search of bread.

[Antic] Could the DSK be that political force which through its political wisdom will manage to contribute to resolving the overall Kosovo problem, or will this alliance be forced to bow to the day-to-day political needs of the nationality's interest?

[Hisaj] The Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, as far as I know, has never courted the people, nor has it ever promised a freedom that would be won easily. Political wisdom is the main prerequisite for solving all human problems. We did not drop into this space from the sky nor have we been cursed by God to live in perpetual slavery. In this time, we have gained full spiritual freedom, and that is a triumph of which we can be proud. The Albanians in Yugoslavia, like it or not, exist as an important political factor essential to any peace in Yugoslavia and indeed in the Balkans. Those who conduct politics with arguments of force are probably not ready for the new world that is coming, a world in which strength is measured by a different yardstick.

[Box, p 7]

The Chances of Discussion

When they realize in Serbia that the strength of a people is no longer measured by the number of weapons, and when Serbia's policy is no longer created exclusively on memoranda giving it the right to use all means legal and

illegal to pacify Kosovo, a discussion from those positions would make no sense. The discussion must be conducted with full equality and respect for the interests of both sides. That at least is what I think. It must be clear to people in Serbia that it is not possible to live forever in this kind of political tension, which is being artificially created and reproduced in the name of winning yet another "battle" on a battlefield where no one wants to wage war. It is too bad that people are still taken in by those deceptions, which can very quickly place the Serbian people in Europe's pillory.

[Box, p 7]

Separation of the Radicals

[Antic] The DSK has lost some of its followers. Hadjidi Alidemaj has left it and formed his own party. There are said to be other similar examples. It is said that certain former political prisoners do not agree with this leadership and that they will leave. What is your view of that?

[Hisaj] It is well known that there are individuals and large numbers of impatient people among the Albanians who are losing their patience and trust in the democratic options for resolving the Kosovo crisis. They will attempt to radicalize the course of resisting the occupation by forming new parties with more radical options than those advocated by the DSK. I think that those radical options will have followers in the Albanian people depending on the degree of repression of the Serbian authorities. At some point, people will lose patience. Conflicts which are constantly being provoked, as is happening right now, can create a suitable terrain for a radical response with countermeasures.

There are limits to human patience. The defense against terror, when it goes on permanently, will bring the mass of people to a state of desperation in which they will no longer have anything to lose. The radical forces, and also those who languished away in their best years in Yugoslav prisons will gain the moral and political right to seek their own followers and change the course in a resistance movement. If some should leave the DSK and find their followers for new parties, I see nothing bad about that. The political scene in Kosovo will be richer by one more political option. If things develop like that, the time to come will create the space even for a radical party with a hard-line national course. It is up to the people to choose the one they will mandate to achieve their goals.

Serbian Interior Minister on Kosovo Situation

91BA0722A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
19 May 91 p 14

[Article by Z. Zejneli: "The Serbian People Will Be Protected, Wherever They May Live"]

[Text] Pristina, 17 May—Radmilo Bogdanovic, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Serbia and people's deputy, has visited certain opstina centers these last few days in Kosmet, Pristina, Prizren, and Urosevac, where

he talked with the competent authorities from the security centers there about the overall security situation. In the joint talks it was said that the situation in Kosmet and in the country is most critical that it has been since the war. We have had a state of war in Croatia, and all of this is having repercussions on the disposition and security situation in the Republic of Serbia, Bogdanovic said.

According to what he said, in Kosovo and Metohija, especially in those communities where the percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins is small, there is great unrest. In Urosevac, Prizren, and other towns, there is talk of certain announcements of Albanian separatists, about uprisings, about border crossings, and so on.

Unrest in Gorance

The people in Gorance also feel threatened, especially concerning the announcements of the Albanian separatists and the border crossings. Zur, which is still a problem, is not far away. The people of Gorance, who are right on the Yugoslav-Albanian border, feel isolated both because of the operation of the Albanian separatists, and also because of the operation of the SDA [Democratic Action Party], the people from that party, and also various announcements of its leaders. However, they have no reason to worry, nor do any citizens of Serbia who consider Serbia their state, because we are ready to protect every citizen, not only with the police forces, but also with organized protection, which also includes the police reserves, Radmilo Bogdanovic said.

At this moment, according to Bogdanovic, the most important thing is to ensure public order and peace, to prevent the smuggling of weapons, but also to completely secure the border. As for the crossings from Albania, which are announced, so far about 1,000 Albanian citizens have attempted to cross, and almost all have been returned. "We will be vigorous in this. After all, in view of the changes in Albania, there should not be refugees from that country at this point seeking political asylum. It is obvious that the intention is different—to gather data, contacts with Albanians and separatist forces. The reference is to data related to plans for opening an 'expanded Albania' and of intentions to disturb public order and peace, but we will prevent and frustrate that."

As for protection of citizens, Serbs, Montenegrins, even those on the assassination lists, are protected. It must be clear to everyone that Kosovo will not be a republic.

Security for All Citizens

In answer to the question of whether there are Albanian policemen in the Croatia MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Radmilo Bogdanovic said that there is no official information about that. A check is now being made, and this will soon be known, but there nevertheless are certain indications. At the same time, information is also being checked concerning the alleged arrival

of Croatian police in Kosmet, concerning the deaths in Borovo Selo, and concerning the funerals.

"In spite of the contacts and attempts to learn [about] this from the Croatian MUP, so far we have not received that information. In [our] contact with Voljkovac, it has not been confirmed that they know anything at all about that, nor have they responded to our requests. Ljuz Gasi is the only one about whom they know. There were reports that he was involved, but this is being cleverly concealed. There are also people moving out of Kosmet, and all of that can be related to the involvement of the Albanians in Croatia, which is now being studied," Radmilo Bogdanovic said.

In answer to the question about meeting the request for turning over former Kosmet leaders who are in Croatia, Radmilo Bogdanovic said:

"From the contacts which I have had with Voljkovac and Degoricija, it is not possible to obtain good information on that. I asked for Jusuf Karakusi, Jusuf Zejnulahu, Muhamed Bicaj, and Iljaz Ramajli to be extradited, but there has been no answer to that request. I also asked to meet with Karakusi, but there has still been no agreement on that either. Karakusi, incidentally, is the initiator of the exodus from the ranks of the security forces in Kosmet by Albanians," Radmilo Bogdanovic said in the conversation with newsmen.

[Box, p 14]

Karakusi Has Applied for a Pension

Jusuf Karakusi, who is at large, has sent an application to be awarded a pension. However, he can realize this only if he comes to do the paperwork.

The Armed HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]

"Armed members of the HDZ, as well as members of Veselica's party are constantly exerting pressure on the Serbs in Croatia. This is related to the pressure being put on the Serbs in Kosmet. Voljkovac, in spite of all the agreements, has abolished the Secretariat for Internal Affairs of SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina, that is, the Serbian police. A great deal of that can be expected now. It is possible to make a move against the police on the pretext that they are illegal police. However, I think that the government in Croatia will not decide to do that lightly. Voljkovac has even stopped the pay of policemen in SAO Krajina. After our conversation, he gave them one month's pay, and now he has stopped that altogether. The situation in Krajina is difficult because the HDZ has broken into Serbian houses and has been abusing citizens. And the signing of the loyalty oath is putting great pressure on the Serbs. Not a single policeman wants to sign it and place himself under the chessboard because they say that during the war it was precisely under the chessboard that the Ustashi killed people," Radmilo Bogdanovic said.

Serbia Accused of Being 'Political Bully'

91BA0716B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
19 May 91 p 1

[Article by Hido Biscevic: "The Beginning of the End"]

[Text] The Serbian political bullying, which has demolished yet another federal institution so as to prevent the timely and peaceful shaping of a new model of the community on this soil, has brought Yugoslavia to an end point in its history. But, although we can truly speak of the end of an era, the cynical masquerade of the presidency of the state is actually only the beginning of the final operations of that hellish plan prepared back in Tito's time, which was politically elaborated by the Eighth Meeting, and which was announced in operational terms by Gazimestan.... And which, in spite of everything, has so far been effective. The backbone of that plan is the formula of what is called rescuing the federation precisely for the sake of breaking it up. The goal: installing an expanded Serbia in the territorial and political space of the former Yugoslavia. The technique: the hypocritical manipulation of Yugoslav and socialist sentiments, people, and institutions, until the manipulation brings each individual conflict to a white heat, and then the very vehicles of that superpatriotism would be cast on the trash heap of the Balkan-Byzantine conception of politics and morality. Why, however, repeat what is well known at a moment when Milosevic's maneuver has removed one more of the three remaining federal institutions? Simply because the game with the presidency of the state truly signifies the end of a phase—but also the beginning of a new one, also assuredly prepared already. That is, it is difficult to believe that Serbian bullying irrationalism can now, after four years of gathering steam, all of a sudden be brought to political reason so that it might stop before it pushes all the peoples here and many neighboring peoples, including the Serbian people, into a cataclysm of bloodshed. In other words, precisely according to the formula which he has been applying up to now, we have to expect that Milosevic will continue to destroy the remaining federal institutions. We should be ready for that, then, in the political, effective, and defensive sense. Practically speaking, we might expect a speedy final blow to the federal government—perhaps institutional, in the Federal Assembly, more likely outside institutions, by organizing a general strike and with large-scale unrest so that marches of social rebellion can be turned from Dedinje toward Markovic. At the same time, we can expect feverish attempts for a new round of violence to whirl in every way in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina so as to totally open up the territorial question. The staging of violent new conflicts would bolster the so-called need for intervention of the Army, which would bring to its culmination the division that already exists in Army ranks and thereby cause a disintegration of even the last federal institution. Thus, Yugoslavia would for all practical purposes disappear once and for all from the historical stage with no chance of being peacefully reshaped into a

new type of community. Serbia would take for its property the largest possible portions of the former joint institutions, from the political to the military, and the other four republics would remain alone in confronting Serbia. The sluggishness of international political action could, in terms of time only, facilitate the final phases in the execution of this plan. There is no need to even mention its far-reaching political and historical consequences. But we need to be fully aware of it in advance, we need to prepare for that eventuality in advance, by creating defensive alliances and through an unambiguous international political action. The world public should even today be aware of that plan in all its details and ultimate consequences. After all, the final result of today's Serbian policy, as it is being conducted by the Milosevic phalanx, objectively can only be a vortex of war in the Balkans. It is an illusion that only the Albanians, the Macedonians, the Muslims, the Croats, and the Slovenes will pay the price, it could cost Europe dearly.

Transformation of United Serbian Opposition

91BA0722B Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
20 May 91 p 5

[Article by S. Lekic and I. Radovanovic: "A New Alliance or a Parting of the Ways"]

[Text] Belgrade—What, up to now, has been the United Opposition of Serbia [UOS], formed last year on the eve of the second round of elections, [which] began to undergo transformation on Saturday: The leaders of eight opposition parties agreed behind closed doors on the formation of a "new and firmer alliance," to be called the Associated Serbian Democratic Opposition [USDO].

The public was informed about that agreement by TANJUG in a rather scant report in which the official formation of the new alliance is announced for Wednesday, when the party leaders will meet again and sign a rewritten document on reorganization of what, up until now, has been the UOS.

Those participating in the agreement were representatives of the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], the Democratic Party, the NSS [People's Peasant Party], the SRSJ [Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia] for Serbia, the SLS [Serbian Liberal Party], the NRS [People's Radical Party], New Democracy, and the Democratic Forum, but TANJUG has reported that "most of the party leaders have accepted in principle the text of the document on association, on which the competent bodies of the parties will take a position in coming days."

It is interesting that for the first time since the elections the Serbian opposition decided to agree on such an important decision behind closed doors and to inform the public about all the details only when everything was set—at the press conference on Thursday.

In spite of all the walls built up around the "new Serbian opposition," we have learned unofficially that the idea of it "occurred" in the heads of the people from the very top leadership of the SPO and SLS, and Kosta Cavoski, one of the leaders of the Serbian Liberals, was commissioned to write up a founding document (this is the one being edited before Wednesday).

We have learned from sources close to the highest levels of the SPO that those finishing touches are above all of a "terminological nature" and that there is "no chance whatsoever of changing the essence," which is the formation of a "national democratic coalition" which will rally the "Serbian democratic opposition," and not, as the UOS has done up to now, the "democratic opposition of Serbia."

That fact and the large space already reserved in the founding document for the "Serbian nationality question," and that in the manner in which it has already been treated in the program of the SPO, are the main reasons why the composition of the future Associated Serbian Democratic Opposition is also somewhat different.

It quite certainly will not include the UJDI [Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative], whose representatives refused even earlier any idea whatsoever of a "national alliance" and therefore were not even invited to join in Saturday's agreement. Nor will there be the Liberal Party from Valjevo, but it is assumed that its representatives were not invited because of its "scant importance." We have also learned from well-informed circles in the SPO that on Saturday there was certain reserve toward the formation of an "ethnic coalition" on the part of representatives of the People's Peasant Party and, we were told, "one wing of the SRSJ."

Sources close to the NSS say that this party has not yet made the final decision whether to join the new alliance, above all because of the dilemma over this issue. It is stated this way: "Who needs an ethnic coalition?"

Even though its presidium held a meeting yesterday, the SRSJ has not finally decided whether it will join the new association or not either. In answer to that question, the people in the party answered diplomatically: "We consider that the UOS still exists."

Nevertheless, we have learned that the chances are quite good that the SRSJ will not enter the "Serbian democratic opposition" and that only three of the 15 members of the presidium favored joining the alliance, and they did so "because of the possible political advantages that come from operating within an association." This "prediction" (that the SRSJ will not enter the new alliance) could possibly be spoiled only by the fact that Ivan Djuric and Vojin Dimitrijevic, certainly two of the most influential people in the SRSJ, have not said either "yes" or "no" concerning the new coalition.

Even though, in response to the question of whether the Democratic Party would join the USDO, the answer

obtained from reliable sources who attended the Saturday meeting was "absolutely," we have learned that even in this party there is a "certain reserve." We still do not know precisely what reservations those are, but the very fact that Dragoljub Micunovic, Radosav Stojanovic, and Zoran Djindjic were not in Belgrade suggests that the Democrats will adopt their final position only in midweek, after the return of these leaders. Nevertheless, it is assumed that this party will either have to "swallow" the fact that their "rabid opponents" from the SLS are sitting at the top of the new association or they will have to find a very good excuse for not joining the USDO. Above all, because it is clear even now that all those who do not want to enter the "Serbian opposition" will run the risk of easily being accused of betraying national interests.

In any case, the existence of the new alliance (and that a Serb alliance) is obviously a done deal, and the only question is who its members will be. Another question is whether those who may join the UJDI and not join the USDO will manage to keep the United Opposition of Serbia alive.

Croatian Government Protest Note to Serbia

91BA0694A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
15 May 91 p 1

["Text" of the protest note to the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted 14 May by the Government of the Republic of Croatia: "Irrefutable Proof of Constant and Systematic Interference"]

[Text] The Government of the Republic of Croatia adopted in its meeting on Tuesday the text of a protest note to the Government of the Republic of Serbia stating the following:

In conducting the policy of the Republic of Croatia, in exercising its powers, and in its practical activity the Government of the Republic of Croatia and other Croatian government entities have pursued the primary goal of realizing the legitimate interests of the Republic of Croatia, not that of causing harm or difficulties to any other republic in Yugoslavia, including, of course, the Republic of Serbia. It is in the permanent interest of the Republic of Croatia that the Republic of Serbia, as well as the other sovereign republics in Yugoslavia, achieve progress in all areas.

Resting on the foundations of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian Government is firmly committed to strongly encourage, develop, and guarantee on the territory of the republic full respect for the rights and freedoms of all citizens regardless of nationality, religion, language, or cultural legacy. There is not a single issue related to the life and status of citizens, including issues related to the nationality of citizens of the Republic of Croatia which cannot be settled by legal procedures within the existing institutions of the legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

Foreign Experts Welcome

The Government of the Republic of Croatia has notified the United Nations and important international organizations that any group of experts or politicians who wish to publicly verify the respect of human rights and civil freedoms by the government entities of the Republic of Croatia are welcome, and at any time and in any part of the republic.

The achievements of civilization, of economic integration and economic development in almost all states on the one hand, and the pitiable state of the economy of all the republics in Yugoslavia on the other, make reasonableness in activity and mutual understanding on the principles of strict respect for sovereignty and legality imperative to everyone in this region. The Government of the Republic of Croatia is resolved to act in keeping with those clear facts and developments in the international community. Activities in the opposite direction would be an expression of primitivism and would lead to the Middle Ages.

In spite of the commitments which have been stated and also international standards, the Republic of Croatia has for quite a long time now faced flagrant, constant, and systematic interference of the Republic of Serbia in the internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, of which the Government of the Republic of Croatia has irrefutable proof.

Official Representatives Participating

Official representatives of Serbia and members of parties registered or operating in the Republic of Serbia are taking part in activities against the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia.

Armed actions against the Republic of Croatia are being prepared on the territory of the Republic of Serbia. Along with rebels from the ranks of the Serbs in Croatia, citizens of the Republic of Serbia are also among those carrying out terroristic crimes on the territory of Croatia.

Tacit and now also open support is being given to Chetnik and other extremists in the statements and actions of representatives of the public authority of the Republic of Serbia.

There is information that has been verified concerning the illegal delivery of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and food from the territory of the Republic of Serbia to terrorist groups operating in the Republic of Croatia.

In addition, certain terrorists, citizens of Croatia, fleeing criminal accountability, have been given refuge in Serbia.

The Actions Come From Serbia

The theoretical basis, and recently also the practical actions to pursue the design of subjugating and carving up Croatia also undoubtedly come from the Republic of

Serbia, from that segment of official and unofficial circles which supports westward and southward territorial expansion of Serbia.

Every means is resorted to in the pursuit of those intentions, including the murdering of Croatian policemen, false accusations of the Croatian Supreme Command, and indoctrination of Croatian citizens of Serbian nationality suggesting to them that they are subjugated and have lost their rights and freedoms.

We wish to emphasize once again that citizens of Serbian nationality in Croatia do not need the protection of the Republic of Serbia. The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia has guaranteed them all civil rights and political freedoms, and that therefore includes cultural autonomy as well. The immense portion of the Serbs in Croatia support the legal government of the Republic of Croatia and distance themselves with bitterness from the seditious and lawless activities of the extremist and Chetnik groups and individuals, who are tearing down the foundations of the community life of Croats and Serbs and prompting deep distrust, intolerance, and, most dangerous of all, hatred.

Since August 1990

The covert and overt aiding of those forces which want to bring down the democratically elected government in the Republic of Croatia dates from August 1990. In that period, a number of contacts have been recorded between the highest representatives of the Republic of Serbia with the leaders of the rebellious groups in Croatia, and on those occasions Serbia promised support which has been forthcoming in many forms.

Many Serbian politicians have visited Croatia without addressing the legal authorities. Every one of their visits has signified initiation of new intolerance and a new wave of seditious violence, and has destroyed the efforts of the Croatian authorities to facilitate through negotiations a political solution to the problems that have arisen in the community life of Croats and Serbs in Croatia. The instigatory statements by Stanko Cvijan, member of the Government of the Republic of Serbia, the minister for ties with Serbs outside the Republic of Serbia, and Milan Pareski have even caused tragedies in Borovo Selo at precisely the moment when the situation in that region had stabilized to some extent, and there were real opportunities for a peaceful settlement. If the Government of the Republic of Serbia admits that Cvijan, its minister, spoke in public together with the Chetnik Vojvoda Vojislav Seselj in Borovo Selo, how can it deny its dangerous meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia?

In addition to a number of Serbian politicians, retired military personnel and also other figures from public life and associations based on the disguise of helping the Serbs in Croatia have also taken part in activities against the Republic of Croatia and on its territory. The leaders of Serbian National Renewal and the Serbian Radical Party have publicly declared the participation of their

members and detachments infiltrated from the Republic of Serbia (Vojvodina), and they have taken responsibility for the crimes committed. Instead of undertaking legal steps against the criminals, the authorities of the Republic of Serbia have remained mute or, even in bodies of the state at a high level, have been attempting to justify the crimes in terms of the need to protect in this way the Serbian population in Croatia, which is allegedly in jeopardy, and they cynically portray the massacre of the wounded and then savagely murdered Croatian policemen as a deception on the part of the Croatian authorities.

Encouragement and support of terrorist acts from Serbia have in large part served to escalate the violence in Croatia. Over the period from mid-August 1990 to the beginning of May 1991, there have been 209 cases of explosives being placed in the Republic of Croatia and 109 armed attacks in which 16 persons died, including 15 policemen. There have been 56 persons wounded, mainly with serious consequences, 40 of them policemen.

We possess information on the constant presence of armed members of radical Serbian parties in Croatia and on the activities of extremist groups, one of which is being tried in Zagreb at this very time. As a rule, these are citizens of the Republic of Serbia, which is where the inspirers of their actions are also located.

Overt Support of the Minister for Serbs

It is significant that the minister for Serbs outside Serbia, who has been mentioned, recognizes the terrorist hotspot in Croatia as a 'legal institution' and collaborates with that hotspot and offers it open support. At the same time, he turned a deaf ear to the invitation of representatives of the Government of the Republic of Croatia sent him on 22 February 1991 for representatives of the governments to meet, to debate in an open and direct conversation, and to jointly propose a solution for the outstanding issues.

For all those reasons, the Government of the Republic of Croatia sends a sharp protest to the Government of the Republic of Serbia and energetically demands that in the future the Government of the Republic of Serbia not allow on its territory the organization of actions directed against the Republic of Croatia and that it detain and try the criminals who took part in the cruel murders of the Croatian policemen.

At the same time, we propose that through direct negotiations of members of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Government of the Republic of Serbia or parliamentary delegations we arrive at solutions that will contribute to a peaceful outcome of the Yugoslav crisis.

State of Opposition in Croatia Discussed

91BA0703B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
16 May 91 p 4

[Article by Branko Podgornik: "Opposition Challenge to the Government"—first paragraph is VJESNIK introduction]

[Text] It is not unusual, amidst all the adverse circumstances, for radical elements within part of the Croatian opposition simply to push the Croatian government into undertaking contrived actions that it, given its frequent public assurances, has no intention of completing.

Judging from all indications, the liberal Serbian politician Ivan Djuric was mistaken when he said a few days ago that there is no opposition in Croatia. Perhaps it is not very strong and not as well rounded as Serbian liberals would like, but as far as the current Croatian government is concerned it is nonetheless annoying.

Sharp criticism from some opposition politicians and public figures directed at government policy over the past 10 days has unquestionably come at a time of greatest threat to Croatia. This criticism shows that what we are dealing with here is not simply a conflict between pro-Serbian and pro-Yugoslav oriented federal and republican political forces on the one hand and Croatian forces on the other hand; rather, there are new signs of conflict within the Croatian political corpus which, along with the former, has been smoldering since last year's election campaign. One politician has characterized it as a conflict between "generals" and "corporals."

Return From Purge

The first group includes primarily the people who launched the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]. Some of them held positions in the communist system for many years, only to be expelled from it when they came in conflict with it, not infrequently even before 1971. The others, primarily the young generation of opposition figures, were also relieved of their posts, but only after managing to "get a taste" of the situation and of membership in the League of Communists. To put it bluntly, all of them in some way or another were cut from the same mold, but the ones with shorter internships are now criticizing those with longer ones because they have returned to the summit of power by democratic means. Perhaps it is not insignificant in all this that the better known people from the "Croatian spring" fared better in the purges of two decades ago because of international public opinion, while those who are lesser known suffered more, often being persecuted and tortured in prison, so that some of the latter now consider themselves "more morally pure" and more worthy of the Croatian cause.

For all of them, the goal is a sovereign Croatia, but there is less and less agreement between the various parties and people in choosing what road to take. Part of the criticism of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, Josip Manolic, Stipe

Mesic, Josip Boljkovac, and other politicians in the most responsible positions consists of the charge that they do not have a strategy for effecting the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia, and that through concrete steps taken after the election in the economy, in politics, and elsewhere they have demonstrated a "Bolshevik conscience." Josip Boljkovac, in particular, is reproached for "unnecessarily sacrificing Croatian youth" in Borovo Selo and Plitvice. The most radical circles associated with the Croatian Rights Party accuse leading figures of Croatia of having recently "signed the capitulation of Croatia" in Belgrade and of working on some sort of "third Yugoslavia," also alleging that they could even be capable of "turning JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] tanks against their own people."

"Dilettantes and Adventurists"

On the other hand, the government for some time now has been accusing certain opposition politicians of being inexperienced "dilettantes and adventurists" and of being ignorant of the workings of government and of the internal Yugoslav and international circumstances amidst which the Yugoslav crisis and the aspirations for a sovereign and democratic Croatia are unfolding.

For example, when the Croatian government—based not only on its commitment to a democratic resolution of the crisis, but also on its awareness that Serbia is much more powerful since, besides terrorists, it also has a stronger MUP [Ministry for Internal Affairs], with the Army clearly in the background as well—adopts a tactical approach to the terrorists directed by Serbia and insists on interrepublic talks, the opposition accuses it of vacillation and of "consenting to the occupation of Croatia," even though the majority of opposition politicians, just like those in the government, talk about how problems must be resolved peacefully as long as that is possible.

Whenever the Croatian police react as they did at Plitvice and Borovo Selo, some people refer to mistakes made by the police, even though, on the other hand, they themselves talk about how we have a "young police force," a "young government," and a "young democracy." When the shortage of an adequate cadre for the functioning of the state prompts this new government, for lack of alternatives, to seek the return of certain people who also worked in the communist system to leading posts in state agencies, then some people again criticize the government for carrying out the re-Bolshevization of Croatia, or for effecting a symbiosis with former or "converted" communists—even though the fact is that all of them have in their own way abandoned communism, as we have noted. Judging from all indications, some people, wanting to abandon it as quickly as possible, are applying similar methods.

Communist-Style Criticism

For example, attentive readers have recently been able to read criticism in several publications leveled against

Prime Minister Josip Manolic, Police Minister Josip Boljkovac, and even President Tudjman himself. Many people are reconsidering and examining the actions of these men, which are unquestionably logical and desirable. When there are no strong arguments against their actions, however, people delve into their past and seize upon certain secret documents, precisely in the communist style. When someone had to be relieved from a post in the former system, charges were brought against them and they were declared politically unfit. This used to be known as the communist struggle for power, but it is hard to say what it should be called today.

One thing is sure, Croatia is caught between the suddenly awakened desires for sovereignty and independence and the rigid demand that some form of Yugoslav community be maintained, as insisted on by the great powers, but also by the majority of the Yugoslav republics. The theory that the fall of the Berlin Wall signaled the beginning of the rapid achievement of independence by new national states in Europe's multiethnic communist "empires" was apparently premature, because the great powers are preventing this from happening. Similarly, it has been seen that it is impossible to abandon the former economic and political system quickly and on the basis of desires; rather, this process must be accompanied by material assistance that the West has made conditional on the acceptance of the rules of conduct of the developed and powerful world.

Quest for Allies

On the other hand, the majority of Croats are probably aware that their state will be only as sovereign and as democratic as they themselves choose. But how can this be done under the conditions to which the majority of them are already subjected? How, if not by force, with weapons, which some people implicitly want? Failing to respect the rules of the game that are consensually accepted by Western Europe and the United States—which, as some people warn, left Croats under the leadership of Radic in the lurch during the first years of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and in a certain regard in 1971 as well—would mean choosing the role of terrorists and untrustworthy disturbers of the European peace. Simply noting that the Croats are an ancient people who stood in defense of Europe makes no sense, because this approach leaves the European players cold. Moreover, two or three years ago the Serbian leadership, too, searched in vain for its old allies, saying that the Serbs had defended European civilization back at the Battle of Kosovo.

One unabashed inference from some of the opposition criticism is that the Croatian government under the leadership of Dr. Tudjman is authoritarian and undemocratic. Admittedly, the imposed conditions under which Croatia must function lately are rather unnatural and demand authoritarianism, just like all historical situations dominated by a large amount of uncertainty concerning the survival of the system. However, it is not

unusual, amidst all the adverse circumstances, for radical elements within part of the Croatian opposition simply to push the Croatian government into undertaking contrived, radical, and forcible actions that it, given its frequent public assurances, has no intention of completing. Specifically, in this way Croatian policy would in fact begin to [word illegible] that which it regards as the main obstacle to realizing its interests in Yugoslavia today.

Tudjman on Referendum, Failure To Elect Mesic

91BA0716A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
19 May 91 p 3

[Article summarizing television interview with Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, on Croatian television in Zagreb on 18 May 1991: "The Referendum Is a Historical Day for the Croat People"]

[Text] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia, in the interview of the week which he gave for Croatian Television Saturday evening, asked to say how he interprets everything that has been happening in recent days in Belgrade concerning the failure to elect Stipe Mesic president of the SFRY Presidency, said:

The Breakup of Yugoslavia

"This view of Serbia's that it does not accept normal constitutional procedure concerning succession at the head of the Yugoslav Presidency is worse than irrational. Given the governmental and political crisis which Yugoslavia has been experiencing, this would seem to be that decisive step which is already hurtling it down the precipice. It is not Stjepan Mesic personally who has been called into question, this is a question of the attitude toward the Republic of Croatia, toward the rights which Croatia has had even under that SFRY Constitution which, though violated, still exists."

President Tudjman went on to say that this act was not only an attack on Croatia; Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia were also ignored. He added that it is this that indicates that Serbian policy is committed to breaking up Yugoslavia and that actually it was not interested in preserving Yugoslavia, because in this act it declares itself to be not only opposed to the will of the Croat people, but also opposed to the resolute positions of Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia. "I can say that it has divided Yugoslavia in accordance with the Churchill-Stalin agreement, whether Serbian policy wanted that or not, and the irrationality in that respect is truly surprising, as it is they did not examine all the consequences that follow from that not only for all the republics except Serbia, but also for Serbia itself," Tudjman said.

"Now it will presumably be clear to the entire world why we in Croatia and they in Slovenia have resolutely committed ourselves to the proposal for seeking a way out of the Yugoslav crisis in a new treaty relation, in an alliance of sovereign republics," Dr. Tudjman said,

stressing that now international factors have sufficient evidence of the correctness of the demands of Croatia and Slovenia and likewise of the unsuitability and unacceptability of the Serbian policy both for Croatia and for the other nationalities.

An Alliance of Sovereign States

In answer to the question of what he foresees the final act of this drama will be like, President Tudjman said that in spite of everything he still hopes that we will avoid tragedy, and he said that he "thinks that efforts by us and others have not been altogether abandoned to persuade [the nationalities] that an alliance of sovereign republics would be the solution for all the nationalities of the present Yugoslavia and all the republics."

"It can no longer be a question of any third Yugoslavia, but it can only be a question of an alliance of sovereign republics on the soil of the present Yugoslavia, which, if we could achieve it, would be in the interests of all the nationalities, because there may be certain common interests in the economic field, in commerce, and other areas. But the prospects of that are slim, and it is precisely this decision of Serbia's to jeopardize the community in this way that probably hastens the decision, this time not only by Slovenia and Croatia, but also by other republics, in favor of independence and sovereignty," President Tudjman said.

In answer to the question of whether Croatia is committed and already prepared for such an act, Dr. Tudjman answered in the affirmative, recalling the victory of democracy in the elections and the adoption of the Croatian Constitution late last year, which specifically proclaims that, "because it is stated even in the Constitution that Croatia is a sovereign state, that we are in Yugoslavia so long as we are conducting negotiations concerning the transformation of Yugoslavia into an alliance or until the Croatian Assembly adopts a different decision. But these moves of Serbian policy have compelled us to make decisions perhaps before we complete the talks concerning a peaceful democratic settlement," President Tudjman concluded.

On the Journal SRBIJA

Asked what he thought about the special edition of the journal SRBIJA, on which Dragoljub Micunovic, Jovan Raskovic, Ivan Djuric, and other well-known names collaborated, and whose title page bears the borders of an expanded Serbia, Dr. Tudjman said that this is the program for an expanded Serbia that we have encountered since Garasanin's "Outline" in the last century right up until the present. "What we confront is an attempt to realize that program even at the price of resorting to terrorism, to Chetnik incursions into Croatia, and to everything that happened from Knin all the way to Borovo Selo, and also to drawing in the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army] into realization of that Serbian expansionist program. But those attempts have not yielded the results the scenario writers expected, because

the non-Serb nationalities are offering resistance to that, and even the YPA has, so far, not gone onto the side of carrying out that program even though certain individuals within the YPA have actively placed themselves on the side of that program."

Dr. Tudjman reiterated his opinion that the Yugoslav crisis should be resolved peacefully and tragedy avoided, "because if we cannot achieve an agreement on the sovereign life of the republics, then we should achieve an agreement on a peaceful parting of the ways."

"If plans are being made for an expanded Serbia, people should realize that the entire Croat people do not live in Croatia," he emphasized, adding that the Croat people are determined and ready to defend their democracy, freedom, and sovereignty, and the supreme command will not bow down under pressure nor appoint another representative suitable to Serbia to replace Mesic.

On the Referendum

Finally, in answer to the question of what the Croat people and all citizens of Croatia should express in Sunday's referendum, President Tudjman said: "Even in the elections we received the confidence of the Croat people and a mandate that the Croatian Assembly adopt decisions which it feels are in the interest of Croatia. However, in view of the exacerbation of the governmental and political crisis and the desire expressed by international factors that a solution be found within the framework of Yugoslavia, we have been responding that we have in fact set our goals in such a way as to achieve, if it is possible, the sovereignty even of an independent Croatia within the framework of Yugoslavia, i.e., within the framework of an alliance of sovereign republics as states, but if that is not possible, then we are not willing to reconcile ourselves to any halfway solutions."

Nevertheless, the international public accepts a people's decision in a plebiscite as something that cannot be passed over, Dr. Tudjman continued, and said: "Even though we had the basis in the Constitution to adopt the decisions which we consider necessary, we still decided on the referendum, and here we have expressed our entire policy. We asked the Croat people whether it is in favor of Croatia being a sovereign and independent state which recognizes all the rights both of the Serbs in Croatia and all the others, which guarantees those rights, and which can enter into an alliance if the other republics, as states, desire such an alliance? That sovereignty and independence in an alliance implies the right to the status of an international entity, to our own armed forces, and an agreement as to what kind of joint armed forces there should be if any. That question expresses our entire political philosophy and the program of Croatian policy, which is also in keeping with the desire of the Croat people to be sovereign and independent and with contemporary world achievements of democracy, which is also in keeping with internal relations in Yugoslavia

and with the desires of international factors in order to preserve the international order and stability of the peace."

The Will and the Future of the Croat People

President Tudjman expressed a desire that the Croat people express their will in the referendum so that it might be appealed to by the leadership of the state in its negotiations to resolve the crisis in Yugoslavia both for purposes of its own definitive decision on what we should do and so that the world sees what the Croat people desire and the obligation it places on its government leadership, its government, and the president himself. "I do not doubt that on Sunday the Croat people will show that awareness and decisiveness which it showed in the elections last year, when we won a democratic victory of which we can be proud. I hope that most of the Serb population in Croatia, as well as the Croat population, will vote in the referendum, because only a free and democratic Croatia guarantees the sovereignty of the Croat people, but also the civil and ethnic rights of all others in Croatia. I await the historic day of the Croat people that will decide that our decisions have been made in the interest of the future of the Croat people," the president, Dr. Tudjman, concluded.

Bosnian Interior Ministry Press Conference

*91BA0715A Belgrade NEDELJNA BORBA
in Serbo-Croatian 18-19 May 91 p 5*

[Article by M. Lucic and D. Pusionjic: "The MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] Under the Magnifying Glass"]

[Text] Sarajevo—For the first time since the SDA [Democratic Action Party], SDS [Serbian Democratic Party], and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] took power in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a press conference was held yesterday in the MUP [Ministry of Internal Affairs] at which there were more questions than specific answers. What is more, MUP officials asked the newsmen to reveal to them their sources and provide proof for the data incorporated in their questions.

Alija Delimustafic, minister of the MUP, did not come to the meeting, and we might single out as the most important piece of news an item reported by Zitomir Zepinic, deputy minister, that intensified security measures were in effect throughout the republic, and that "of the highest possible in this kind of situation." Particular protection is being given to facilities which "according to our information are of interest to certain people," such as the bridge in Zvornik, on the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, transportation in Krajina, Gorazde, Herzegovina, and other locations, and even the MUP building in Sarajevo.

Disputing the statement of Vice President Miodrag Simovic that the MUP is not at this hour in control of the security situation in the republic, Zepinic said that "the MUP is not sufficiently in control of the situation,"

but no one in Yugoslavia is managing to do that. Confronted with numerous disinformations related to its performance, the MUP decided in the future to file (criminal) charges, and in response to the question of whether this applied to the statement of Vice President Simovic, Zepinic said "we will see, should it be proven"—but he did not spell out what was supposed to be proven.

In response to the question of whether there is a division in the MUP and opstina police stations along ethnic and party lines, as stated publicly by Radovan Karadzic, leader of the SDS, and Vice President Simovic, Zepinic categorically declared that "there is none of that." However, in view of the overall situation in the republic, the MUP, in establishing commissions to investigate numerous cases, was forced to institute an innovation—making the commissions ethnically mixed. And the MUP is also making decisions "with broader participation." There is great interest in the MUP and public security stations, Zepinic said, because every party believes that it has not taken power unless it has influence on the police.

As soon as the move was made to questions about specific cases, it became evident that the MUP, although it had summoned the newsmen for a conversation, did not have or was not releasing complete information.

There are many underground channels for arms in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but all have not yet been cut off, the MUP has discovered various calibers and types of guns, but "they were not intended for armament on an ethnic basis." The MUP is unable to go into the question of whether illegal arms are being channeled as arms of this or that nationality. In the interest of the investigation, the MUP cannot say anything about the Mausers and bullets found in Banjaluka and Sarajevo "on two religious officers of the Islamic faith," about the murder of a taxi driver in Zvornik, nor about the fire in Teslic.

Zepinic resolutely denies that there is a Croatian MUP post in western Herzegovina and that an effort is being made in Bosanska Krajina to form parallel police forces. In response to the question of whether Vojislav Seselj had formed armed Chetnik "hordes" on Romanija Mountain, Zepinic said that the "formations which Seselj formed are his formations," and in response to the follow-up question of whether they were armed, he answered that the MUP "has no knowledge of Seselj's followers being armed."

The most controversial response was in answer to the question of what happened two days before at Pale near Sarajevo. The MUP checked out information there to the effect that there was a shipment of arms over Romanija Mountain, and this in connection with a person "who had been of interest to security forces earlier." The special police were in civilian clothes on Pale, so that there would be no "opposition to an action of the MUP," but that it is a "fact that the search was not made at night, and therefore the citizenry was justifiably

upset." "We did not break into houses and conduct searches, but that night there was a conventional burglary, with which our forces had nothing to do." Zepinic acknowledged that the action was carried out without notifying the state security station in Pale.

[Box, p 5]

Abduction of Croatian Policemen

So far, officers of the Croatian MUP have been brought in two or three times on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, twice in Orasje, [where] even firearms were used, and three [times] in Bosansko Grahovo (twice in civilian clothes, once in uniform) [and] were armed with three hand grenades, three rifles, three pistols, silencers, three panzer suits, and a large amount of food, Zepinic said. The Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina yesterday formed a commission to study the case in Bosansko Grahovo, because it is "understandable that we must ascertain why they were on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina." The Croatian MUP explained in a telegram that those three were in Bosnia-Herzegovina on their own and without a mission for the Croatian MUP. Asked what the MUP had done because the three Croatian policemen had been turned over to Martić's

militia, Zepinic said that 30 of Martić's armed men set up an ambush "outside the territory of the opstina Bosansko Grahovo" and took away the Croatian policemen. In answer to the question of whether Martić's men did this on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zepinic answered that he did not want to talk about that now.

[Box, p 5]

Market Cooperation

"I have still not run across an apology in EKSPRES POLITIKA for all that was written about the communication between our Minister Delimustafic and Minister Josip Voljkovac. It is natural that we should have contracted for a certain quantity of equipment with our colleagues from the Croatian MUP. No one is calling us to account for similar agreements with the Slovenian MUP! Soon we will also be seeking a delivery of certain products of EI NIS [Nis Electronics Industry] from the Serbian MUP. The MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina will operate like a market-oriented consumer; if necessary, we will purchase equipment even abroad, indeed even materials for uniforms, because they are cheaper there." (Zitimir Zepinic)

BULGARIA

Military Reform, Gulf War Discussed

91BA0575A Sofia REPORTER 7 in Bulgarian
28 Mar 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Major General Stoyan Andreev, senior science associate, candidate of technical sciences, assistant chairman of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, and head of the Center for the Study of Problems in the Formulation of the New National Security System; interviewer, place, and date not given: "Army Reform: Farewell, Conscript—Hello, Colleague; Military Doctrines as Seen by Maj. Gen. Stoyan Andreev"]

[Text] [REPORTER 7] General Andreev, did the Gulf War surprise you in any way?

[Andreev] I do not want to sound immodest, but the war did not surprise me, either by the actual large-scale military operations or by the technology for waging a supermodern, superintelligent war. But I would not say that it was not a surprise for many important agencies and organizations in our country.

Why? Because this was a war, first and foremost, of two styles of military strategic thinking: the one a style characterizable to a great extent by categories, proportions, and criteria of World War II—modernized to be sure—while the military operations that the Allied Forces conducted in the Persian Gulf bore the attributes of an entirely new style. They were essentially a highly organized activity based on superintelligent weapons and control systems, with tremendous participation—and that in real time—of major scientific institutes. Space reconnaissance conveyed data about the deployment of the Iraqi Army, about the structure of its armed forces, about the actual readiness of the various weapon systems, and even about the enemy's combat morale.

All this was evaluated in high-power research centers in U.S. territory and returned by satellites to the staffs of the Allied forces in the theater of combat operations. Every attempt of Iraq at any kind of real action was picked up at once by global intelligence media and counteracted while it was still at the planning level. I rate the air operation as brilliant because I cannot think of a higher rating. I have received criticisms: How can such ratings be given? They are not realistic, they are political, and so forth. But my rating is purely one of military technology. On this score, it must be said that the Americans used things that only they have at such a level. For example, the Patriot antimissile system. This is a prodigious scientific achievement—creating a system that, under conditions at the front, intercepts and destroys any enemy ballistic warhead with over 80-percent probability. Science demonstrated its decisive—I would even say, highly humane—role because it simply localized the scale of the war and spared huge casualties. This surprise—scientific and technical, but on a strategic

scale—considerably disquieted large institutes and specialists throughout the world, including quite a few Soviet experts, too.

[REPORTER 7] A while back, at a meeting organized by the Moscow City Council, the conclusion was drawn that the war proved the indisputable superiority of the American military doctrine, grounded on a professional Army and supermodern equipment. In reply, Marshal Yakov declared that "the Iraqi Army's defeat is not a defeat of Soviet weaponry." In your opinion, whose is Saddam's defeat—Iraq's alone or a defeat of Soviet weaponry and of Soviet military doctrine, which is our doctrine, too?

[Andreev] I would not answer your question categorically. Iraq is still an Arab country with a semiliterate population and, naturally, an equally illiterate Army. The Iraqi Army had the MiG-29 aircraft as its most common plane and was unable to get out of it even 20 percent of what its creators incorporated into it. The same holds true for the conventional artillery systems. They are very good, but Iraq did not have effective means of controlling them.

The American and Iraqi Armies are not comparable military forces intellectually, nor are they comparable either in respect of the quality of armaments. But, if this equipment had been in the hands of Soviet crews and, provided that the control infrastructure had been built, the results would have been completely different.

[REPORTER 7] Will a reevaluation of our doctrine be made at an official level?

[Andreev] I think that reform in our armed forces is imperative. I am categorical that our Army must, to a large extent, be professional because the American operations have shown that such superintelligent systems cannot be serviced by nonprofessionals. All the potentialities of these costly weapons cannot be mastered in two years. Expert groups must be set up that will, without delay, begin to prepare the necessary calculations and plans and, of course, a new law on the armed forces, but I want to say that, without the participation of scientists and of the public in the implementation of this reform, it cannot be made effectively or painlessly. Therefore, let a discussion be held, and let it be seen what Bulgaria will lose and what can be saved if it introduces the professional principle in the establishment of its armed forces.

The professionals must give their opinions frankly. What is needed is frank analysis, seriously reasoned from positions of Bulgaria's interests. Enough of this mystery, this supersecrecy, this concealment. What are we hiding? That our emperor has no clothes, that we do not have the intellectual readiness to solve the problems of national security.

Even convinced adherents of the conscription system will give up their positions when they understand the advantages of a professional army.

NATO Position on Eastern Europe Analyzed

AU2305102091 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 20 May 91 p 4

[Commentary by Petur Bochukov: "Missile Threat Goes out of Fashion, but NATO's Protecting Wing Will Not Extend to the East"]

[Text] Last week the last Pershing-2 missile was destroyed in the State of Arizona. At the same time, the last SS-20 was also blown up in front of the television cameras. This marked the end of two of the material symbols of the cold war that for a whole decade formed the nucleus of the East-West conflict. Now the strategic offensive arms treaty is on the agenda and is likely even this year to fill the world, now changing for the better, with new hopes.

Now that the missile threat is going out of fashion and the Warsaw Pact no longer exists, we are left facing the acute problem of quickly building a collective system of security in Europe. The advancing democracies in Eastern Europe feel insecure because the old structures have been broken down, but new ones have still not been created, and all the signs show that their creation will be a complex and lengthy process. This is the reason that influential political forces in these countries are striving to draw closer to NATO and, if possible, place themselves under its wing, in order to be able to obtain certain guarantees in case of need.

NATO's response to this attempt is restrained and, for the moment, may be summarized in the formula: "Everything is possible, except for military protection." Deciphered into plain language, this phrase means that NATO will assist in drawing the East European countries closer to Western institutions and will give them an opportunity to seek their place within the structures of Europe. However, at the same time, their claim for official membership in the North Atlantic Alliance will be discouraged. The explanation for this position is very simple: If NATO attempts to extend the zone of its traditional influence to the East, this will be to the detriment of Moscow. Regardless of its great internal difficulties, the Soviet Union still remains a superpower in the military sense. On the other hand, strategic imbalances always mask serious risks. At the least, they may hand trump cards to the conservative forces and supporters of the hard line in the Soviet Union and doom to failure the efforts for stabilization and reforms.

A clear and unambiguous signal of NATO's intentions in this respect was provided recently at the meeting between James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The diplomatic chiefs of the two most powerful NATO states reached agreement on the organization's future links to the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. In their joint declaration, they listed 10 possible and, in their view, acceptable forms of contacts, the most important of which are: visits by political leaders, participation of former Warsaw Pact members in NATO's nonmilitary activities, and aid in the field of conversion of military plants.

At present, the United States and Western Europe are unanimous that NATO must be preserved but should not extend its military protecting wing to the East, in order to ensure that the balance of forces remains intact. The voices of politicians like UK Conservative Alan Clark, who believe that military alliances atrophy or cease to exist once the specific threat has disappeared, evoke no response because, in the present situation, the lack of political stability in the Soviet Union is regarded as a potential threat.

Given these realities, the treaties under preparation between the Soviet Union and the East European countries, Bulgaria included, form an indisputable element of the security structures in Europe, provided, of course, that these treaties leave no place for suspicions that the interests of one of the parties may be disregarded.

Conversion of Military Production Under Way

AU2205091691 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 16 May 91 p 1

[Report by Katya Yaneva: "Military Plants Producing More Civilian Production"]

[Text] The ratio between civilian and military production in the Bulgarian companies that make weapons and military equipment is 60 to 40. This was announced at the 15 May briefing of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services. Until 1988, which was the peak year of our defense industry, the ratio was 70 to 30 in favor of military production.

Some 26 percent of defense industry production will be renewed. As a result of the conversion, the military plants are producing metal-cutting machines and instruments; machines for transportation, agriculture, textiles, and the food industry; and elements for automatic systems. There are 23 associations with foreign companies, most of them with Soviet partners. The goal is to facilitate the conversion of the joint enterprises for civilian production and to diversify the assortment of goods.

Some 25,000 persons have been cut from the personnel of military plants in 1989 and 1990. Some 10,000-12,000 workers and specialists will be laid off during the current year.

The debt of the military plants to the state amounts to 1.5-2 billion leva. Sales in the USSR have dropped from a few billion to several hundred million dollars, after the decision of the two countries to pay in convertible currency. Because payments are based on clearing, the weapons-producing companies will receive the leva equivalent of their production.

Daniel Graham, a participant in the "Star Wars" program, who recently visited our country, rated the technologies, equipment, and specialists of our military plants highly.

Rakovski Legion Agreement With Interior Ministry
AU2305094191 Sofia in Bulgarian 17 May 91 p 1

[Commentary by Ventsislav Lakov: "Did Officers Become Freemasons With Epaulets?"]

[Text] On 16 May, the Rakovski Officer Legion officially "conquered" also the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The victory was marked by the signing of a document containing the basic principles governing relations between the legion and the ministry.

The document envisages rallying the country's officers in order to ensure the professional status and career of the people who wear epaulets. At the same time, the Bulgarian officers of the two ministries must guarantee the peaceful transition toward democracy and cooperate to counteract destructive phenomena and the activation of elements that act against civil peace. Attention was devoted to the activity aimed at preventing ethnic conflicts and the struggle against "conventional and unconventional crime." Without any discussions, Minister Khristo Danov and Captain Doychin Boyadzhiev signed the document on behalf of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Rakovski Legion, in front of the journalists who attended the ceremony. Afterward, the guests were kindly asked to leave.

Behind the thick walls of the ministry, the new guarantors of democracy continued their work under conditions of their traditional secrecy. For the credulous, there remained the declarative documents, according to which the transition toward democracy will be protected by constitutional means alone. Thus, one could not understand who the enemies of the transition are and how the struggle against them will be conducted. The special services could answer the first question, while the second is not a problem of the Army. It still is not clear whether democracy will somehow succeed in saving itself from the possible malicious guardianship on the part of the new and mysterious Freemasons with epaulets.

Grand National Assembly Commission Meets Officers
AU2305092791 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 17 May 91 p 1

[Report by Eng. Major Bozhidar Spasov: "When Military Doctrine Is Discussed"]

[Text] A meeting took place in Sofia on 16 May between people's deputies, members of the Grand National Assembly Commission on National Security, and the Military Council of the unit in which officer Angelov

serves. Afterward, on the initiative of the Officer's Legion Club, a meeting with the unit's officers took place.

Officer Enev spoke about the need for foreign guarantees for our security, our internal problems, and the need to effect military integration with the West without disrupting relations with the Soviet people and Army. He also spoke about having a strong General Staff, independent in the face of political opportunism and engaged only in preparing and training the troops.

Officer Anyu Angelov expressed the opinion that, while he was not an expert, he nevertheless is a specialist and thus could contribute his opinion and proposals to formulating military doctrine. However, he noted with disappointment that the doctrine has been prepared and sent for discussion without the participation of officers who command branches of the Army. Officer Rusinov said that we need a professional army, but not now and not immediately. He also said that it is impossible to destroy the Army and create a new one in its place. Finally, he said that we must not fall under the influence of political passions, and release with a light hand officers who have great experience in staff work. Officer Tsvetkov recalled that nuclear weapons will remain a decisive factor in the next 20-30 years. He objected to the cuts in the chemical troops in the Army, which are being carried out at lightning speed, and to the insufficient limits [nedostatuchniya limit] of these troops, something that hinders their training. Officer Malchev talked about the problems of the Air Force.

Mr. Ivan Nevrokopski, deputy chairman of the Grand National Assembly Commission on National Security, also took the floor at the meeting, followed by Messrs. Khristo Dobrev, Dimitur Yonchev, and Kamen Petrov.

Tanks Moved on Day of Parliamentary Walkout
AU2205100691 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 16 May 91 p 1

[Report by Petur Boychev: "Were There Tanks at Sofia Central Railroad Station on the Night of 15 May?"]

[Text] Yes, there was a movement of tanks. General Zakhari Iliev, commander of the Sofia Garrison, confirmed the tip-off from our reader Lyubomir Mitov. Ten T-55 tanks were loaded on the train at Gorna Banya and transported to another garrison in the country. Gen. Iliev said that military equipment will also be transported in the future. Structural changes are taking place in the Army, and they are related to the new defensive military doctrine. This should not cause the public concern, Gen. Iliev said. The tanks at Sofia Central Railroad Station on the night between 14 and 14 May had no connection with the notorious Day X [15 May, the day on which 29 deputies of the Union of Democratic Forces walked out of the National Assembly].

General Stefanov, spokesman of the Ministry of Defense, told a DEMOKRATSIYA reporter that no

instructions for announcing a state of increased combat readiness on the so-called Day X were issued.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Country's Basic Military Doctrine Published

91CH0544A Prague REPORT in Czech 11 Apr 91 p 7

["Text" of "Military Doctrine of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic"]

[Text] The Federal Assembly of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic announces the CSFR military doctrine:

I.

The CSFR military doctrine is based on the following fundamental principles:

- The sovereignty of the CSFR in resolving all questions concerning preparations for the defense of the state in accordance with the right to self-defense in the spirit of the UN Charter.
- The unity of the contents of the military doctrine and practical measures with the goals of the foreign and domestic policy of the state, respecting the specificities of the geographic situation of the CSFR and its constitutional structure.
- The proportionality of the armed forces with the needs of reasonable defense sufficiency within the context of the emerging European defense system.
- All-citizen defense of the constitutional structure of the state, its unity and territorial integrity as an expression of the will of the nations and nationalities in the CSFR.
- An even balance between the economic potential and social climate and the buildup of the armed forces and implementation of the economic mobilization plans for the defense of the state.

In addition to the demonstrated determination to exercise, in case it is needed for the preservation or restoration of the state's sovereignty and its territorial integrity, the right to self-defense by means of its own armed forces, it is important for the safety of the CSFR to achieve such a degree of confidence in the cooperation and mutually advantageous relations between nations and states that would eliminate the possibility of solving disputes among them by the use of military forces.

CSFR is therefore determined to participate in all proceedings aimed at strengthening international trust, stability, and security in Europe. It is ready, in accord with achieved results within the framework of the disarmament process, to fundamentally restructure its armed forces in the shortest possible time and in such a way that they would guarantee the defense of the state and would not represent a potential threat of aggression. It agrees

that there should be an objective control of the compliance with the adopted agreements, one that would not compromise the security and sovereignty of the countries, and it also lays claim to participating in it.

CSFR will continue to use its best endeavors to achieve a reduction of armed forces in Europe to a level that will ensure security in equal measure for all countries. It will also strive to have the criteria for reasonable security sufficiency agreed upon for all of Europe within the framework of the Helsinki process of developing and strengthening European security and cooperation.

CSFR considers the defense of the independence of its democratic state as its highest right and duty, not only of the state but also its citizens. Under no circumstances will it initiate a military action against any other country, unless it becomes the object of an armed attack. It does not give up its right to participate in ensuring the collective security of other countries if they are threatened by military aggression. It does not claim the right to a greater guarantee of security than it gives to other countries. It does not have and will not assert any territorial claims against any other country.

CSFR does not possess and does not produce nuclear or other arms of mass destruction, and will never make the effort to possess them. It will not allow the placement of such weapons on its sovereign territory.

CSFR is prepared to make its armed forces available within the framework of the UN peacekeeping forces, the UN Military Forces, and in the event of ecological or other natural disasters.

CSFR does not allow propaganda promoting armed aggression, terrorism, chauvinism, nationalism, racism, fascism, class and religious intolerance that would impair the stability of international and domestic relations.

CSFR adheres to and will continue to fulfill its obligations stemming from the UN Charter, the final act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] in Helsinki, the final document of the followup meeting in Vienna, the document from the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the Vienna Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Paris meeting of the highest representatives of the CSCE countries, as well as other treaties and agreements. The CSFR military doctrine respects these obligations.

II.

CSFR is fully aware of the risks present in the transitional period toward a more effective and reliable security system in Europe. These risks stem from the different levels of democracy, economic, social, and national development, and from different approaches toward resolving these imbalances. Even after the consequences of the bloc system of the security structures in Europe are totally removed, these risks will not be

eliminated. In accord with the all-European effort CSFR will adopt and implement such measures that will enable it to deal effectively with such risks, including the use of sovereign military force.

CSFR also takes into consideration the possibility of threat from areas other than Europe, as well as the possibility that other kinds of threats will arise.

The proof of the will of the CSFR to contribute to confidence-building among European nations by concrete acts is the decision to carry out a fundamental restructuring of its armed forces. The goal of this restructuring is to build an army of an exclusively defensive character.

The CSFR military doctrine is a doctrine of a reasonable defensive sufficiency of the state. It determines the principles of preparedness and details the use of the armed forces, the use of the national economy and the participation of the population in the defense of the state.

The decision to use the armed forces in accord with CSFR interests and international treaties lies with the CSFR Federal Assembly.

The key armed force and one of the bearers of the country's sovereignty, as well as a distinct integrating factor of its federal structure, is the Czechoslovak Army.

The main task of the Czechoslovak Army is to avert, upon detecting preparations for a military attack on the CSFR, the danger to the sovereignty of the CSFR by a timely adoption of the necessary defensive measures. In case of aggression to repulse ground as well as air attacks by the aggressor from any direction and on any part of the CSFR territory. To destroy the forces which penetrated on the Republic's territory by active operations of the regular or mobilized forces aimed at restoring the territorial unity and sovereignty of the state. To ensure on the entire CSFR territory the defense and protection of the population and facilities important for the functioning of the state, and undo the consequences of enemy aggression. In so doing, to make use of the support provided by the European system of collective security.

In fulfilling this task, the Czechoslovak Army relies on the assistance and solidarity of the citizens. Sharing in it are armed units of the Ministry of Interior and civilian armed units, especially by protecting and defending important facilities on the territory of the state.

The Czechoslovak Army consists of ground troops, military air force and troops of the integrated air defense, whose character and defensive purport will be determined by a set of laws on the defense of the state. It is vertically divided and centrally directed, equipped with all types of troops and a comprehensive rear for directing

defense operations. Its peacetime strength will be augmented by mobilization as needed.

One of the basic tasks of the structuring of the armed forces is to deepen the democratic character of serving in them. The training and education of the soldiers, guided by the principle of direct and integral responsibility of the commander, instill discipline and develop personal responsibility in the spirit of patriotism, above-party attitude, military regulations, and general legal norms.

Civil defense as a part of the defense of the state includes a set of organizational, professional, material and technical measures aimed at the protection of the population and the material values of the society from the consequences of natural, industrial, or ecological disasters in peacetime and from the consequences of an enemy attack on the territory during wartime. Preparations for civil defense are centrally directed.

For a comprehensive defense of the state, its functioning during wartime, and for supplying the armed forces, a system of an economic mobilization is used, federal material reserves are formed, and an operational readiness of the state's territory is carried out. This system and the adopted measures correspond with the current conditions of directing defense, organization, and deployment of the armed forces, the conditions of the market mechanism, and the international political situation.

III.

The principles of the military doctrine are codified and detailed by the legislative acts of the CSFR Federal Assembly, the Czech National Council, and the Slovak National Council.

The implementation of the military doctrine is ensured by the executive bodies of state power under the control of the representative bodies which evaluate, or, as the case may be, approve, the basic documents of the state's defense policy.

Important issues of defense policy and the method of implementing them are made public in the program announcements of the Federal Government.

Military-technical measures of the doctrine are detailed in the documents on the structuring of the armed forces and preparations for civil defense, in the plans for economic mobilization, in operational plans and other documents which are continually updated in accord with the developments in the military-political and economic situation.

The control of the implementation of the CSFR military doctrine in the armed forces is carried out by the CSFR Federal Assembly.

BULGARIA**Lilov, Pushkarov Discuss Cooperation in Bonn***AU2205085591 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 17 May 91
pp 1, 3*

[Report by Dimitur Hadzhinikolov: "Lilov Talks With Distinguished Social Democrats in Germany"]

[Text] Bonn, 16 May—At the end of his visit to Germany, Aleksandur Lilov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP], once again had talks with distinguished representatives of the German Social Democratic Party [SPD]. After Willy Brandt, his hosts were Hans Koschnick, member of the leadership of the SPD and vice chairman of the Bundestag's Commission on Foreign Affairs; Hans-Eberhard Dingels, leader of the International Secretariat of the SPD; and Gernot Erler, deputy in the Bundestag and chairman of the German-Bulgarian Parliamentary Group.

After the meeting, Erler told DUMA that contacts between the BSP and the SPD had been discussed, and also the question of the future development of Bulgaria in the direction of a united Europe. Attention was given to the difficulties that would crop up on this road. The talks were of an informative nature. Aleksandur Lilov talked in detail of the present development of the BSP and its organizational condition. He answered in detail the questions put to him by the SPD representatives. The question of Bulgaria's role in East-West relations was raised in the light of the changes occurring in Europe.

The unofficial visit to Germany of Ivan Pushkarov, minister of industry, trade and services, also ended. At a meeting of businessmen and diplomats at the Association of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in Bonn, he explained that the main aim of his meetings with representatives of leading German companies of heavy industry was to suggest that Bulgarian companies be bought on the basis of the principle of "foreign loans in exchange for property." In his statement, Pushkarov said that the monetary stage of the reform was approaching significant results. He pointed out that the most important aim of the structured reform under way was "the radical, very speedy, and mass privatization of government property, with a view to providing conditions in the next two to three years for private business." The minister was asked questions about the foreign trade debt with the USSR and links to the former GDR.

Prof. Todor Vulchev, chairman of the Bulgarian National Bank, is also in Bonn. He is there in an academic capacity, to take part in the "New Europe—Strategies for Cooperation" International Conference organized by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the SPD.

First Private Currency-Exchange Bureau To Open*AU2205074691 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 15 May 91 p 2*

[Text] The first private bureau for exchanging foreign currency will be officially opened in Sofia on 16 May. The bureau belongs to the Krama Associated Company, whose chairman is Todor Krundev. The company was the first of 300 applicants to obtain a license to trade in foreign currency.

The bureau will buy and sell both convertible and nonconvertible currency.

The Krama Company engages in wholesale trading in food and consumer products, in chemicals production, and in finance. German, Austrian, and Greek firms are partners in the company. Last year, the company had a turnover of 6 million leva, whereas the turnover in the first few months of this year has been 7 million leva.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA**Jan-Apr Economic Results Outlined***LD1605190491 Prague CTK in English 1606 GMT
16 May 91*

[Text] Prague May 16 (CTK)—Consumer prices in April 1991 in Czechoslovakia were 65.4 percent higher than in the same month of last year, the Federal Statistical Office said today in a report on economic results in the first four months of this year.

Following some regulated increases during last year, food prices went up by 30 percent in January when the state control of prices was discontinued. Since then, the rate of increase has been steadily declining and even slight decreases have been reported in the last few weeks. Consumer goods went up by 20 percent in January, but their prices are still rising.

Food prices last month were 58.5 percent higher than in April 1990 but the increase over March was only 1.6 percent. The prices of goods rose by 79.7 percent over the year and by 5.6 percent against March.

In the year ending April 1991 living costs went up by 60.8 percent in employees' families, 63 percent in farmers' households and 55.7 percent in old-age pensioners.

The turnover of a sample of retail organizations dropped by 10.9 percent in prices and by 48 percent in volume in comparison with April 1990.

Goods production declined by 10.5 percent in the first quarter of the year, with the most acute decline registered in the readymades, leather, and electrical engineering industries. The fuel, paper and pulp, and energy industries increased their output.

The volume of construction work in the first quarter of this year was 30 percent lower than in the first three months of 1990.

POLAND

University Economic Program Updating Discussed
9IEP0452A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 24 Apr 91 p III

[Interview with Dr. Marian Wisniewski, assistant dean for student affairs, Economics Department, University of Warsaw, by Joanna Maciejewska; place and date not given: "New Reforms From the Old Briefcase"]

[Text] [Maciejewska] The process of reforming the economics program is taking place at many schools. In the Economics Department of the University of Warsaw too?

[Wisniewski] Our department has long been in a state of permanent change. I cannot see a clear time boundary separating its operation in the old and new systems. Today we know the direction in which these changes are to go. But we were also aware of this six years ago.

[Maciejewska] So why were these changes not carried out to the end?

[Wisniewski] No economics school can outpace its times. One cannot expect that if an economic system changes suddenly, a school will have programs already prepared, is implementing them, and is supplying personnel prepared for the new circumstances.

The way the Economics Department operated before depended on three factors. First, an awareness of the divergence between the program of education in our school and in other higher schools of the world.

Second, the institutional element. We cannot hide it; in the past we were subject to the control of the ministry. We did not have the chance to formulate a program consistent with our sense of needs. The four-year struggle with the ministry over the program we call "old" today depicts very well what we went through. It was possible to introduce something new into the curriculum, but it was always adding new elements to the block of inviolable subjects. Every change increased the number of hours the student had to devote to participation in lectures.

And so it came to the point where our student has an average of 40 hours of work a week. That is so much that one cannot expect independent study from him.

Finally, the third factor, usually underestimated, is the popularity of studies from the field of contemporary economics. If five or ten years ago we had attempted to introduce a course in the field of advanced micro or macroeconomics or banking techniques, then, setting aside the question of whether we would have been prepared for it in terms of staff, the courses would not

have enjoyed any interest anyway. At that time, the labor market attached no importance to whether there was knowledge about economics behind the diploma. Students always adapt their efforts to the benefits they can achieve in the future, and so they choose the easiest way.

[Maciejewska] So what will the substance of the program be?

[Wisniewski] We do not want the choices in our department to be directed immediately, and students will choose a specific specialty only after two years of study. Our department is proposing three courses of study: economic-social [as published], quantitative methods of economics, and foreign trade.

The last course has always enjoyed the greatest success. So it has been necessary to execute a strict selection. It is not good when it takes place during entrance exams. We also want to introduce the opportunity for two-stage study. After just three years, a student would have the chance to complete his studies as a degreed economist, or could continue them for the next two years and receive a master's degree.

The new program also assumes much more freedom. The first year comprises about 20 hours a week, the second no more than 24, and the third and fourth less than 20 hours. Fifth year students will spend no more than eight hours a week in lectures.

We will attach more weight to independent study. We want our students to participate in courses in various departments, such as law, sociology, mathematics, and management. A young person studying here will be a student of the University of Warsaw, not just the Economics Department.

[Maciejewska] And foreign languages?

[Wisniewski] Things have not been the best with that either. We are placing our main emphasis on English. One condition in earning a master's degree will be passing the state exam in that language. Students will also be able to learn other languages. But those will not be compulsory.

[Maciejewska] What, in your opinion, would students like to change first?

[Wisniewski] Often names themselves are important to students. So departing from the general name economics and using the names microeconomics and macroeconomics is unavoidable. This is a legitimization of changes that have been occurring in the contents of the subjects taught for some time.

Our course on the economics of socialism has not existed for several years. Two years ago it was divided into a seminar on micro and macroeconomics.

Another element to which students call attention is textbooks. Using recognized, that is Western, textbooks is crucial. And these, unfortunately, are in English.

Today students know much more about studies in Western schools than they once did, so they constantly compare how it is "there" and "here."

[Maciejewska] Within the framework of the program changes, do you intend to improve the computer laboratory situation?

[Wisniewski] To a great extent this is a financial rather than a substantive problem. By involving our department in international and national research, the opportunity for modernizing the laboratory exists, and the change in the curriculum assumes more independent study by students. This means that sooner or later, a student who is working with numbers will have to use a computer.

In the beginning, we want to give them a certain minimum. We have a base, programs, and expect service.

[Maciejewska] In connection with the program change, do you expect a greater number of candidates this year than last?

[Wisniewski] Last year there were two applicants for every place. I think there will be more now. But one cannot foresee how the program change will affect the candidates. Because it could work as a deterrent. Perhaps the changes will be accepted only after two or three years.

[Maciejewska] You said reform of the program had already begun at the start of the 1980's. What do you see as the greatest achievement of your predecessors, and what was their most serious mistake?

[Wisniewski] I am grateful to my predecessors that the condition of this department is very good. The reform of the program that is being carried out during my term (since November 1990, editor's note) is actually an extraction out of the briefcase of old projects that have been changed to a small degree. There are few new elements that were not considered previously. In particular, the very idea of university economics studies has been accepted.

The biggest mistake is the enormous overload. However, I would not call this a mistake, but rather the inevitable cost of earlier changes.

ROMANIA

Foreign Financing Needed To Avert Catastrophe

91BA0734A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 15, 16 May 91

[Interview in two installments with Mugur Isarescu, governor of the National Bank, by Liana Simion; place and date not given: "Without Adequate Foreign Financing, We Are on the Verge of Economic Catastrophe"]

[15 May pp 1-2]

[Text] [Simion] Governor, you probably recall the slew of comments elicited by the second stage of the price liberalization, the scenarios, versions, resignations... What was really the truth?

[Isarescu] The truth is the following: The discussion conducted in the government at the time was limited to the devaluation of the leu. The matter was not made public because such a vital measure could not be announced several weeks before being implemented. The versions you mentioned were strictly linked to the devaluation and to the manner in which its chain effects are absorbed. There was also that unfortunate press communique about the resignations. You wrote about what happened to us in connection with the IMF. Coming back to the devaluation of the national currency, nowhere in the world is such a step decided by public debate. That's a matter for the executive.

[Simion] One may wonder whether the price liberalization had to be linked to the devaluation?

[Isarescu] Devaluation cannot work with rigid prices. We must first draw closer to the economic truth. Then there is the matter of more expensive imports if there are deficits in the balance of trade, which we have. In a way, we are discouraging imports with all the positive and negative chain effects thereof. Positive effects are: Raw materials and imported products are beginning to be doled out, now that they come in at their real value recognized in the international market. Negative effects: Since imports are more expensive, prices in general are gradually rising at various levels. Exports are becoming cheaper, so we are encouraging them. Prices had to be liberalized for this mechanism to function. This is a rather simplistic explanation for far more complex phenomena.

[Simion] Do you plan further devaluations of the leu?

[Isarescu] As you know, we want to unify the official and the free exchange rates. I don't think we can get the latter to 60 lei for the dollar. After a relative stabilization through currency auctions, we hope to arrive at a single rate of 80-100 lei/dollar. That would be perfect.

[Simion] In spite of what you say, the appearance of 500 lei banknotes reinforced people's conviction that the inflation was being officially accepted. After the successive liberalizations of 1 November 1990 and 1 April 1991, what is the inflation rate in Romania?

[Isarescu] In a previous talk with you I made the distinction between corrective inflation, which hails from the more distant or more recent past and is designed to eliminate distortions masked by rigid prices, and real

inflation, about which we can talk only after the stabilization of the current prices. According to IMF calculations, the corrective inflation rate is 146 percent. In other words, it is double plus 46 percent. According to my calculations it is 170-200 percent, i.e., triple. That's about it for corrective inflation. As of June-July we hope to see a relative stabilization of the present prices by limiting the growth of the money volume to 10-15 percent. Concretely, our objective is that the annual price increase should not exceed 10-15 percent.

[Simion] What solutions are available to you in order to halt a possible galloping inflation?

[Isarescu] There are tools of economic and monetary policy and credit policies, such as real positive interest rates higher than the inflation rate. The interest rate serves as a filter for efficiency: The bank will not give credit to enterprises unable to repay loans and the interest on them. Other measures that may be taken are budget and fiscal policies, i.e., differentiated income tax and sector policies. The details are featured in the memorandum sent by the government to the IMF.

[Simion] There is talk that the Romanian enterprises will not survive the trauma of the transition....

[Isarescu] Not true. Our enterprises will find themselves in three situations. The first is the normal situation, meaning that they have positive results and can survive. The second is the situation of enterprises which show a loss but have chances of recovery. That calls for viability studies done by experts for each individual case. Preferential financing may be granted by subsidizing the interest from the budget (a lower interest rate than the current rate) for rehabilitation within a given period of time. Or complete state subsidy for a limited period of time. The third situation is that of enterprises that have no prospects, were ill conceived from the start, and consume more than they produce. This is where bankruptcy comes in, with its financial, economic, and assets consequences and clarification of relations with the bank and the budget. The problem of laid-off personnel comes up. Restructuring is a difficult and unpleasant process from this viewpoint. If such enterprises are not shut down, the economy will suffocate. A pamphlet should be written on the subject of the implications of this process. Unemployment may become a dramatic reality. We have to make the most of every means of training and recycling as soon as possible.

[Simion] Does the government have a classification of Romanian enterprises according to performance criteria? It has been a while since the Revolution, it's time we knew with what we're starting.

[Isarescu] I am not a member of the cabinet....

[Simion] No, but you attend meetings of the executive....

[Isarescu] That is because we're going through a difficult period in which the bank cannot go it alone without the government, and the other way round. The fact that

some officials admitted their responsibility in Parliament was something positive. All those involved, who were in charge of such matters, should have done the same. The delay is already great. Without economic stabilization and aid the reform will fail.

[Simion] That was a diplomatic answer which in fact means no. Recently, your optimistic address in Parliament, juxtaposed on Mr. Vatasescu's pessimism, came as a shock. On what were you basing it?

[Isarescu] The internal structure is probably to blame, too. What I said on that occasion was that two essential conditions must be fulfilled in order to restore the economy: We must secure credits to ensure the necessary imports and we must resolve the domestic financial block and clarify the relationship between enterprises and the state, and between the budget and the bank. I repeat, without appropriate foreign financing we are on the brink of economic catastrophe. At the beginning of March we were close to stopping payments. We have received \$400-500 million of the \$800 million approved by the IMF. We are negotiating with the Group of 24, the World Bank [IBRD], and so forth.

[Simion] I must interrupt. "Certain newspapers" accuse the government of forsaking the economy and sinking it into debt, thereby serving foreign interests and getting us in debt for a very long time to come.

[Isarescu] Those newspapers ignore the fact that we were the last to join the race for loans and that we have to make greater efforts than others in order to regain foreign financial credibility. Hungary, for example, with half of Romania's potential and with \$22 billion in foreign debt, has for over 10 years had relations with Coopers and Lybrand and other specialized firms, has had good publicity, has been active at an international level, and has had hopes. Why should we despair?

[Simion] Why?

[Isarescu] Because we have large assets with a good potential but they don't work. Not yet. We have enormous agricultural potential and production capacities (we must invest only in technological improvements), we must close down some of them, our manpower is relatively well trained and is not expensive, and it presents a certain degree of competitiveness even as it is. We don't have foreign debts. That is essential. What are we worried about? That we will have foreign debts of \$3 million [as published] and will resume our economic growth as of this very summer? Let's be serious! If by the end of the year we have \$3 million in foreign debt, that will only match our foreign assets and the loans we are due to receive from abroad. What matters is how we manage and utilize the loans we get. We have to admit that we are located in a zone of influence. If we want to live in Europe, as they say, we must also assume the risks! Seems to me we don't know what we want. We are scared by the transition. This is a necessary period, very painful, but once we have attained our objective, a market economy, the situation will take care of itself, at

least partially. The terrible trauma is of a cultural order. We are not accustomed with the ideas of a market, of change, of new realities; we react slowly because of the mentalities to which we have been used to for so many years.

[Simion] The reform program is said to be good for export, in other words, it makes a good impression and is liked by foreign experts, but its concrete results in the country are discouraging.

[Isarescu] If it were making such a good impression abroad we would have been overrun by foreign investors. So far neither foreign creditors nor investors have been lining up at the door.

[Simion] But you said that the IMF delegation of experts was very pleased with the negotiations and the program was accepted in its entirety as viable...

[Isarescu] The IMF experts viewed the program as such, but that doesn't mean that they were very happy about its implementation. The World Bank even criticized the "implementation" delays. (I don't like the word either). Did you read that article from the FINANCIAL TIMES? It was translated...

[Simion] Yes, according to that article Romania's population is hostile to the reform, conservative...

[Isarescu] That article is not alone and it tells us a lot about Romania's image abroad. So now we ourselves should accuse the government of fighting to present its program abroad and to change the country's image? That's absurd! You don't know what additional commissions we have to pay for opening each line of credit. Millions of dollars. And that is only because of our image abroad!

[16 May p 2]

[Text] [Simion] Do you think that the reform has made progress?

[Isarescu] Yes, especially in the legislative area. The privatization bill "rounded up" the legal framework required, so the reform and the process of recovery and restructuring can effectively begin. A coherent strategy of transition took shape only last fall, and judging by comparisons with the other former socialist countries, from a legislative viewpoint we have had genuine shock therapy.

[Simion] Was it necessary to hire the firm Coopers and Lybrand to hammer out the privatization bill?

[Isarescu] Of course, it would have been impossible for us to do it alone. Whatever various newspapers may say about us having been able to do it by ourselves, I have to contradict them. Moreover, it was also a matter of the credibility of the law abroad and other aspects.

[Simion] Some experts claim that we should have begun with the privatization, and then liberalized the prices...

[Isarescu] We're back to the question of the chicken and the egg. British Steel took eight years to become private. And that was in Great Britain, which had a functional stock exchange, a budget and fiscal system, and free prices. On the basis of what were we supposed to evaluate our enterprises? Should we have underestimated them at rigid, low, distorted prices? Look what's happening in the former East Germany. It is true that here we had two "alternatives," Mr. Rugina's and Mr. Cojocaru's. The latter involved a kind of acquiring property on paper, the papers in question coming from enterprises working at a loss and with totally unverified assets and efficiency. Give me one example of a country that doesn't have some kind of state property. What is the function of the state? Do we eliminate it?

[Simion] OK, we have reversed the roles. One destabilizing question: What did you pay the IMF and IBRD experts for their help in hammering out the bill on banking activities and the National Bank Statute?

[Isarescu] Nothing. We have been working with them since last spring and they have helped us enormously. Merely talking to them is something; it means international financial credibility. If we had hired a firm of consultants we would have probably had to pay millions of dollars.

[Simion] OK, but don't we have our own experts?

[Isarescu] Our experts, like myself and like you, have studied Marxist political economy. I was lucky. I was hired by the Institute of World Economy. I spoke English, but when the first Reuter cables landed on my desk I didn't understand a word. Different concepts. For almost one and a half years I shut myself in the library, read Samuelson with a pencil in hand. I'm astonished the Institute didn't fire me. Later I gained 20 years of experience by following what was happening in the Western economies. Who in our country knows exactly what a market economy is? What's more, there still does not exist any verified theory about the transition from a centralized economy to a market economy. We are all experimenting. The local experts are too defeatist. Many have not dared assume concrete responsibilities! That includes the institutes of economic research, which still preserve the inertia of criticizing while offering few alternative solutions.

[Simion] How do you handle personal criticism?

[Isarescu] What do you mean?

[Simion] Speaking of competencies and responsibilities, someone said that the "hat" you're wearing is too big for you.

[Isarescu] Yes, I admit that's true. I try to make my head "grow," to read the professional literature, to keep up to date with what's happening in the world, and to exercise my "mandate" as well as possible. But now that you have made me so happy...

[Simion] It was not my opinion. As it happens, I know that in your case there are considerable positive results. Alone restoring relations with the IMF...

[Isarescu] The reality shows that everyone's "hat" is too big, at all levels, from top to bottom. With a minimum of effort anyone can learn. The journalists' "hat" is too big for them, too. Yesterday a foreign diplomat was telling me that the Romanian press have become "terrorists." It is rife with personal commentaries and views, it is drunk on words, and it provides too little correct information. You can't find out anything, it is misleading.

[Simion] The government was recently reshuffled. Can you point to any mistakes made by the Roman cabinet?

[Isarescu] Frankly, I don't have anything to reproach them for. It has been a very brave team, suicidal even. They assumed enormous responsibilities. There were some diagnosis mistakes. The dread of inflation and the idea that the domestic market could not meet the excess monetary volume brought about the wrong treatment. Consumer goods were imported, instead of encouraging domestic production. The money spent in 1990 was over \$4 billion more than in 1989, which means that the currency reserves were spent abroad, while domestically an enormous amount of resources were shifted from production stockpiles to consumer purposes. Imports were affected by the revolutionary euphoria of the first months of 1990. The imports were not even classified by the means we had available for taking them over. A high-ranking official said that in 1990 raw material imports were lower than in previous years, 2 million tons of oil less, I think. I don't agree with this evaluation. Investments were halted, products [energofage] were no longer exported, and facilities were shut down. That's not saving on imports. The reason was production shortfalls. I hope people have not forgotten what prompted the collapse of the former regime: Ignoring the fact that a [energofag] economy that consumes more than it produces cannot survive forever by the whip. Now we don't have any whip! Moreover, after the revolution people acted upon a false idea; they projected a balance deficit which was automatically expected to be financed. That illusion cost us a lot and will continue to cost us.

[Simion] Mr. Isarescu, before you let me know that "time is money" [last three words in English] even though it's a weekend, I want to thank you for the kindness with which you have answered my genuine package of questions. I hope I didn't terrorize you too much.

[Isarescu] Terrorize nothing, you downright assassinated me!

State Secretary Constantinescu on Economic Policy

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[Interview with Dan Anghel Constantinescu, state secretary for problems of reorienting and restructuring in the Ministry of Resources and Industry, by Dan Vardie; place and date not given: "We Want a Balanced Economy"]

[Text] [Constantinescu] Before you begin, I would like to make a few statements about the working system we are preparing in relations between the Ministry and trading companies. There are already 1,500 trading companies and 19 independent administrations including about 324 trading companies. Currently there are documents, roughly 48-50 research institutes, and computer centers in the preparatory stage, so that we are concluding the stage of demonopolization. The Ministry has considerably changed its form and characteristics in the sense that it has shifted toward other activities closer to a market economy. We can no longer involve ourselves directly in the trading companies' activity, and there are no more contacts in connection with scheduling production. We are preparing developmental strategies and legislative initiatives in the fields of economics, finance, customs duties, etc., that correct the national economic process or direct it toward the aims of the government policy that is controlling in the respective stage. The MRI [Ministry of Resources and Industry] wants to become a catalyst of the economic process and a body well informed on its field, and it intends to maintain a strategic balance among the industrial sectors so that the Romanian economy can develop harmoniously. The present departments will be reabsorbed in the form of sectorial divisions under the Ministry and the present volume of labor will be limited to the trade function (with no distinction between domestic and foreign trade), restructuring, retooling and management of social capital held by the state, which is still the stockholder in toto. Through the Privatization Agency the public will be given 30 percent to begin with, the rest of the capital to be sold to companies or private persons through the stock exchange. Those monies will be used for retooling in industry.

[Vardie] When do you think the things that you are telling us will become realities?

[Constantinescu] We are working on those functions now. We will have and have already started well-substantiated data banks.

[Vardie] Are you certain that those data are correct?

[Constantinescu] I am referring to the data we can get in the future from the National Committee on Statistics. Moreover, we want to compile our own data, on kinds of companies, regional market shares, charter provisions, headquarters and object of activity.

[Vardie] Nevertheless, you have not answered my question. Are you sure the data you have taken are correct?

[Constantinescu] No trading company that knows its own interest will report erroneous data. If it does, its market quotations and evaluation will have much greater implications. For the time being, if anything like that is done it is out of ignorance of the mechanisms of

the market economy. The technical literature shows that an underrated or overrated company can self-destruct in market speculations. Correct information lends credibility.

[Vardie] Holding companies have appeared in our economy. What are they and what do they want?

[Constantinescu] And what have they done in the last five years! That structure is not a Romanian invention. In a market economy, besides holding companies there are also concerns, groups or other things that are not provided for in Romanian legislation. The centrals were abolished in Romania. In order to remedy some companies' inability to get along under the new conditions, in order to maintain the state's strategic interest in certain key fields, and in order to build economically and financially comparable structures on the world level, some structures were needed that do not restore the old centrals in their functions, even if they might be structurally identical. We have nine holding companies with more than 240 trading companies. We have called them strategy companies, primarily for purposes of managing the state's capital as long as it is in a majority and maintaining the particular field of activity. In addition, taking their model from the West, these companies provide services, if they are requested, on a contractual basis. These companies do not live on the dividends obtained in the networks in which they operate. The dividends are the owner's.

[Vardie] What shall we do if we find the same people in these holding companies who "populated" the old centrals?

[Constantinescu] Do you consider it necessary for us to design certain organizational structures out of fear of employing some unsuitable people, or rather for us to design suitable structures and look for suitable people to work in them? I do not deny that they have been infiltrated, but it is our duty to select the personnel. We want to make as many companies viable as we can. It cannot be anyone's aim to maintain an unprofitable industry that cannot justify its existence. But if a sector

proves ineffective, we would not want it to disappear entirely, because other industrial sectors up or down the line might depend on it. Hence the idea of a balanced economy. I am telling you that the Ministry will be one and the same no matter who owns the company capital. I say let us get the convertible leu as soon as possible and let everyone be judged by how much and how he works.

[Vardie] To my knowledge you are the first minister to utter the word "strategy." If it exists, please tell us what it consists of.

[Constantinescu] The main objective is to implement the structures of a market economy. Once they are implemented, the companies promote them on the world market on their own account. It will be our task to arrange the long-term economic and financial connections. Our capability will be proven by the promptness with which we foresee the points that arise and find ways to correct any possible deviations from a policy for economic development. I was working until three months ago in an enterprise and I too was infuriated at certain aspects, and perhaps I still am even now, as an individual. These negative phenomena and the lack of strategy of which you were speaking are the results of forces operating divergently and not in the desired or planned direction. Accordingly, measures are taken that do not prove to be the most suitable ones in the long run.

[Vardie] Mr. Minister, there is a postrevolutionary story that we cannot deny. Don't you think that in addition to the disturbing objective factors some equally disturbing factors have also arisen that were politically instigated for the benefit of certain persons?

[Constantinescu] Let me tell you sincerely that I am very poorly informed politically. It is a shortcoming of mine. Moreover, I do not belong to any political party. I like to think that I am a professional and not a politician. Personally, I would avoid making certain judgments about other persons or procedures that I did not know intimately. I do not want to be evasive, but I am not competent to state an opinion.

BULGARIA

Trading, Academic Links to United States Expand

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23 May 91

[Text] Sofia, May 23 (BTA)—The governments of Bulgaria and the US are to start talks on the signing of an agreement on encouraging investments.

If these talks are successful, American investments may be expected in Bulgaria. I do not think there will be any problems on our part, Ms. Gordana Urp, deputy of the Trade Representative for Eastern Europe with the US Trade Representatives Executive Agency, said. In the course of three days she held consultations with a Bulgarian trade delegation.

Ms. Urp explained that the US Trade Representatives Agency with the US President works in the field of the trade policy. After her visit to Bulgaria she will make some recommendations concerning what should be done in order to remove some obstacles in the development of Bulgarian-American trade relations. These measures involve increasing the quotas in some Western markets for Bulgarian export goods, technical assistance in determining the customs duties on these goods and the working out of governmental programmes for encouraging trade. This assistance can be rendered directly by the US or by the G-24, as well as by other governmental organizations. Ms. Urp said that after the legislative bodies of Bulgaria and the US approve the agreement on trade between the two countries, the customs tariffs imposed on Bulgarian goods in the US market may decrease.

A meeting of graduates from the former two American colleges in Bulgaria was held in the "St. Clement of Okhrida" University of Sofia. Prof. Andrey Pantev, chairman of the Bulgarian Association for American Studies, announced the organization's intention to carry out a research project titled "American Educational

Institutions in Bulgaria." The project includes a historical study of American colleges in the Balkans and in Bulgaria. The chief subject of research will be the former Robert College and the Girls' College in Constantinople, the college in Simyonovo (near Sofia) and other American schools which existed until the middle of this century.

Research will be carried out in Bulgarian and US libraries and archives, materials and reminiscences will be gathered from former students and lecturers, a special sociological survey will be held to present a generalized image of the colleges and the fate of their graduates in the last 40 or 50 years. The final goal of the project is to publish a history of American colleges here, thanks to which many generations of Bulgarians kept in touch with American culture.

Housing Protest in Razgrad Continues

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[Report by Galina Antonova]

[Text] The silent protest in front of the building of the Municipal People's Council in Razgrad is now into its fourth day. Over 1,600 sympathizers have signed a petition, rejecting the proposed decree of the Council of Ministers for settling the social problems of certain citizens.

Penko Ganev, chairman of the temporary Executive Committee of the City Municipal People's Council, said that, if this document comes into force, newly built housing in Razgrad will be only for those who left for Turkey in 1989 but came back, and whose previous apartments had already been sold.

Until now, 160 demands have been received from Turkish-speaking families, but, with the aid of the proposed decree, at least another 500 will be included in the housing priority list, Penko Ganev thinks.

The statement of the Razgrad Regional People's Council says that this proposed decree is in violation of the basic requirements of the Law on Normative Acts.